

MPI Report: Tour of Key Countries, February 21-March 9, 2005

March 22, 2005

SUMMARY

From February 21 to March 9, 2005, a Middle Powers Initiative delegation brought the report of the Atlanta II Strategy Consultation to seven NATO capitals, Ottawa, London, Oslo, Brussels, The Hague, Rome and Berlin and a few others countries, including Sweden, Australia and New Zealand to promote pragmatic recommendations for a successful Seventh Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The MPI delegation met with several high-level figures, including Prime Minister Kjell Magne Bondevik of Norway, Deputy Prime Minister Anne McLellan of Canada, Disarmament Minister Marian Hobbs of New Zealand and Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer of Germany, and senior officials at NATO Headquarters, Brussels as well as parliamentarians in several places.

There was general agreement in the governments visited that, while prospects for a successful conference are grim, a number of specific steps should be agreed on by all parties in the interest of preserving the effectiveness of the NPT in stopping the proliferation of nuclear weapons. These steps include the start of negotiations for a fissile material cut-off ban, de-alerting of Russian and the U.S. strategic weapons, making the adherence to the IAEA Additional Protocol a norm for adherence to non-proliferation obligations, and establishing a body at the Conference on Disarmament to deal with nuclear disarmament.

There was great concern over the Iran situation, with a determination to ensure that no State could use the NPT provisions to divert nuclear fuels for civilian purposes into nuclear weapons. Thus there was widespread interest in IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei's proposals for tightening up controls over the nuclear fuel cycle (though there is not yet agreement on whether mandatory international control would be acceptable and workable).

There is virtually complete support for the efforts being made by Ambassador Sergio Duarte, President-designate of the RevCon, to achieve a balance of attention at the Review Conference to both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Much attention is being given to the potential impact of the European Union paper for the RevCon because the E.U. contains a blend of NWS, NNWS and New Agenda States. MPI pointed out that the bargaining position of centrist states, vis-à-vis the NWS on the one hand and the Non-Aligned Movement on the other, would be considerably enhanced by the eight NATO States that voted for the New Agenda resolution in 2004 working closely with the NAC in a common approach to saving the NPT in 2005.

In Ottawa, where a Roundtable was held with government officials and NGO experts based on the Atlanta II Report, four Canadian Non-Governmental Organizations, Project Ploughshares, Canadian Pugwash, Physicians for Global Survival and Lawyers for Social

Responsibility, endorsed the MPI recommendations contained in the Atlanta II Report. These 11 Recommendations are included as Appendix II of this report. Appendix I provides the detailed itinerary of the MPI tour. The delegation was headed by Hon. Douglas Roche, O.C., MPI Chairman, and included Zack Allen, Executive Director of the Global Security Institute, and Alyn Ware, Global Coordinator of the Parliamentary Network for Nuclear Disarmament. Jonathan Granoff, President of the Global Security Institute, and Ambassador Robert T. Grey, Jr., Director of the Bipartisan Security Group, joined the tour in The Netherlands and in Belgium.

PART I: Political Context

The Seventh Review Conference of the NPT occurs in a new climate: the age of global terrorism, which erupted on September 11, 2001, and the pre-emptive use of force in response to suspected proliferation as undertaken, for example, by U.S.-led coalition forces against Iraq.

The United States, in particular, has turned its attention to the development of counter-proliferation measures outside multilaterally negotiated treaties, and has thus established collaborative mechanisms to prevent transfer of WMD related materials to ‘States of concern’ (the Proliferation Security Initiative) and initiated Security Council action to address proliferation concerns including the role of non-State actors (Resolution 1540).

With respect to the NPT, the U.S. claims that their disarmament obligations are being fulfilled, and that the NPT RevCon should concentrate on strengthening non-proliferation measures. Iran, and to a lesser extent North Korea, has become the central political issue, with the U.S. demanding that the “loophole” in the NPT, in which a State might use NPT provisions to acquire nuclear technologies and fuels for civilian purposes and then divert such fuels to nuclear weapons, be closed. In particular, the U.S. has proposed that no new countries should be permitted to develop uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing capabilities. Such an action, if adopted without guarantees of nuclear fuel supply, might well impede many nations from exercising their “inalienable right” (as expressed in the Treaty) to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination. Currently, extensive diplomatic work is being carried out by three European states—the U.K., France and Germany—to resolve the Iranian fuel cycle issue in accordance with the strictures of the IAEA and thus assure the world that Iran is not capable of producing a nuclear weapon.

But many countries are accusing the U.S. and other NWS of a double standard in which they use their power to stop other countries from acquiring nuclear weapons while maintaining and modernizing their own nuclear arsenals. The U.S. particularly has antagonized many States by rejecting two of the 13 Practical Steps (ABM and CTBT) that all States agreed to in 2000 and undermining several more; the mood has been further soured by U.S. insistence that Article VI issues “do not exist.” The whole international community, nuclear and non-nuclear alike, is concerned about proliferation, but the new attempt by the NWS to gloss over the discriminatory aspects of the NPT, which are now becoming permanent, is trying the patience of the members of the Non-Aligned movement. They see a two-class world of nuclear haves and have-nots becoming a permanent feature of the global landscape. In such chaos, the NPT is eroding. The

crisis erupted at the Third Preparatory Meeting for the RevCon when delegates were unable to agree on an Agenda for the RevCon. The Agenda issue is a surrogate for the intensified political struggle.

PART II: ANALYSIS

1. Defining Success at the NPT Review Conference

The biggest question most governments had for the delegation related to MPI's view of what "success" (or conversely "failure") would look like at the NPT Review Conference. There is no easy answer to this question, but the delegation offered the following thoughts: The over-riding aim of the Review Conference must be to facilitate progress on preventing nuclear proliferation and achieving steps towards nuclear disarmament. The best scenario would be if states used the opportunity provided by the NPT to implement or adopt specific disarmament and non-proliferation steps, such as announcing the de-alerting of all weapons still on high alert, ratification of the CTBT, commencement of negotiations in the CD on a fissile material cut-off treaty and/or the adoption of the additional protocol by those states that have not already adopted it.

An acceptable result would be the achievement of an agreed final document which includes commitments by states on both disarmament and non-proliferation fronts. In particular, there should be concrete declared plans by states on how they will implement the 13 Practical Steps agreed in 2000. A Review Conference that ends with a final document devoid of any progress, or worse, constitutes backtracking on previous commitments – particularly the disarmament commitments - would be a failure. If such a final document appeared likely, having no final document at all might be preferable, if such failure to reach agreement could provide a stimulus for progress on disarmament goals in other fora such as the Conference on Disarmament, the U.N. General Assembly, bilateral negotiations, unilateral initiatives or regional processes. A form of success might well be seen in the determination of all the centrist states to uphold the integrity of the disarmament and non-proliferation goals of the NPT in the face of continued intransigence of the NWS. What would not be desirable, however, would be if a failure to reach agreement was used as an excuse by some states to move further away from multilateral treaty-based approaches to non-proliferation and disarmament in a new preference for a more discriminatory coalition or unilateral counter-proliferation efforts. That is why a “balanced” approach is imperative.

2. Strategic approach to the 2005 NPT Review Conference

The disarmament and non-proliferation recommendations from the Report of Atlanta II provided the substance for the discussions in Europe. MPI discussed five types of approaches with regard to possible progress on the disarmament and non-proliferation steps recommended in the Report:

- a. promoting disarmament and/or security steps which could be taken by the nuclear weapon States (NWS) prior to the conference as part of implementing their NPT

- obligations and which would thus establish a positive environment for achievement of non-proliferation goals at the NPT,
- b. promoting the successful resolution of proliferation concerns and conflicts including Iran and North Korea,
 - c. promoting, at the NPT Review Conference, disarmament and non-proliferation steps which could be agreed by all States parties and be incorporated into a final agreed document,
 - d. promoting disarmament and non-proliferation steps which might not secure sufficient agreement for adoption at the NPT Review Conference, but which might secure increased political support in order to pave the way for future agreement and adoption,
 - e. promoting, at the NPT Review Conference, disarmament and non-proliferation initiatives on which preparatory or substantive work could be undertaken regardless of whether or not the initiatives are agreed by all States Parties.

(a) Steps prior to the 2005 NPT Review

It was recognized that the agreement by NWS to begin negotiations prior to the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, and the Negative Security Assurances given prior to the 2000 NPT Review Conference, were helpful in indicating some progress by the NWS in implementing their disarmament obligations and thus providing a climate for successful conferences in those years. There was also widespread recognition that little progress on disarmament has been made since 2000 and that if the NWS were to take some disarmament steps prior to the 2005 NPT Review Conference it would provide a much more positive climate for the conference including the achievement of key non-proliferation goals.

Parliamentarians in particular were very interested in promoting incremental disarmament steps that could be taken in the immediate future, including de-alerting of nuclear forces, establishment of a program of work at the Conference on Disarmament including a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament, the development of disarmament plans by the NWS, commencement of negotiations on a fissile material treaty, entry into force of the CTBT, further cuts in the nuclear arsenals of the key NWS, and reductions in tactical nuclear weapons. A number of parliamentary resolutions and questions have thus been drafted, introduced and /or adopted on these areas in European parliaments and the Australian parliament.

(b) Resolution of proliferation conflicts

The situations regarding Iran and North Korea were identified as key proliferation concerns on which progress would be required to prevent erosion of the non-proliferation norm and the NPT itself. In general, a negotiated approach was preferred to a confrontational one and there were positive indications that all States, including the U.S., were open to such a negotiated approach at the current time. However, there was also general pessimism at the prospect of these conflicts being solved in the near future and therefore the possibility that a more confrontational approach may result.

(c) Agreed steps at the 2005 NPT Review

It was generally recognized that there did not appear to be sufficient political will on the part of the NWS to take any substantive disarmament steps prior to the 2005 NPT Review Conference, and that it was unlikely that the proliferation conflicts would be solved satisfactorily by then. There was general support for the disarmament and non-proliferation steps called for in the Atlanta Report, and that they should be promoted at the 2005 NPT Review Conference with the aim of securing agreement by all States. In addition, there was support for initiatives to strengthen the NPT machinery. This included the German proposal for the establishment of mechanisms to deal with compliance and potential withdrawal, the Canadian proposal to transform NPT meetings into assemblies in order to enhance decision-making authority, and proposals to enhance reporting and transparency through linking the Security Council 1540 reporting process to NPT reporting. However, there was also widespread pessimism that any of these could actually be agreed upon at the 2005 NPT Review Conference. Rather, there was a feeling that there might only be sufficient political will for a final document that included agreement on minimal disarmament steps. And there was recognition that if only minimal disarmament steps were agreed, and important ones agreed in 2000 were missing (such as support for a CTBT), it might not be possible to reach agreement on key non-proliferation steps, such as accepting the additional protocols on safeguards as a universal standard for compliance with non-proliferation obligations.

(d) Building political support for initiatives

There was support for the promotion of disarmament and non-proliferation steps at the 2005 NPT Review Conference regardless of whether or not there appeared a realistic chance that they could be agreed by all States parties. There was a commonly held perspective that the NPT Review Conference provides an opportunity to float ideas for consideration and also to build political will for initiatives in such a way as to pave the way for their possible adoption at a later date. Given the uncertainty of the positions held by key countries leading into the NPT Review, there was some feeling that States did not need to distinguish absolutely between those initiatives upon which agreement could be possible and those on which agreement would not be possible at the Review Conference. An alternative viewpoint was that preparatory work on consensus building prior to the Review Conference was vital in order to ensure the possibility of a final document. In this light, there are preliminary attempts by the European Union to draft text which might form part of an agreed final document.

(e) Work on steps that don't require agreement of all States parties

There are a number of initiatives on which disarmament and non-proliferation work can be undertaken without agreement of all States parties. Some of these are steps which can be taken by the NWS or their allies either individually, bilaterally or collectively, and are included in calls made under section (a) above. They include, for example, de-alerting,¹ removing tactical weapons from external deployment,² and reducing the role of nuclear weapons in security

¹ The UK, for example, took all its nuclear forces off high-alert status in 1998 so that its nuclear forces would now be ready for use within weeks or months rather than their previous operational readiness of days or hours.

² The U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in Greece, for example, were recently removed.

doctrine.³ Others can be undertaken by NWS or non-NWS, including establishment and strengthening of nuclear weapon free zones,⁴ verification work⁵ and the consideration of legal, technical and political requirements for the abolition and elimination of nuclear weapons.⁶

It was recognized that the promotion of such steps at the NPT Review Conference can be useful as long as they contribute to, or at least do not thwart, the building of political will for achieving agreement on disarmament and non-proliferation steps.

3. Iran

It is evident that the NPT Review Conference will see intense controversy over Iran's nuclear fuel cycle. The seriousness of the issue was well recognized among the governments with which MPI consulted. While on the one hand Iran had a right under the NPT to develop and have access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, the capability of uranium enrichment facilities to be used to develop weapon-grade material should Iran chose to do so, provides some concern when coupled with pronouncements by some influential sectors in Iran in support of maintaining the option to withdraw from the NPT if the security situation so required.

The U.S. and U.K. doctrine of pre-emptive use of force to respond to suspected WMD programs, such as the use of force against Iraq, was complicating the situation regarding Iran, particularly as Iran was one of the countries listed by the U.S. as a rogue State, against which the pre-emptive use of force doctrine, and the possible use of nuclear weapons, could be entertained.

There appeared general support for a negotiated response to this situation – the approach currently being taken by key European countries – in preference to the more confrontational approach being pursued by the United States. There was also general satisfaction that the U.S. has for the moment yielded to the Europeans to take the lead.

While some hope can be gained from the success of negotiations with Libya on abandoning their nuclear weapons capability program, it was accepted that the situation regarding Iran provides additional difficulties, not the least of which stems from Israel's continued possession of nuclear weapons, failure to place its nuclear facilities under safeguards and failure to join the NPT.

³ NATO commenced a process, for example, on reviewing the role of nuclear weapons in its security doctrine. However, this review has floundered and needs to be revised and continued.

⁴ Mexico, for example, has invited all States Parties to the regional nuclear weapon-free zones to participate in a conference on NWFZs just prior to the NPT Review Conference. Other States parties to the NPT are invited to attend as observers.

⁵ The UK, for example, has undertaken a study, conducted by the Atomic Weapons Establishment, on the verification requirements for the elimination of U.K. nuclear weapons. However, the U.K. has not opened this study up to participation by other States despite requests to do so.

⁶ In 1997 Costa Rica submitted a Model Nuclear Weapons Convention to the United Nations which outlined the political, legal and political considerations for achieving nuclear disarmament (A/C.1/52/7). Malaysia has released a working paper, for example, on Follow-up to the International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons: consideration of legal, technical and political requirements for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear weapons free world.

<http://www.lcnp.org/disarmament/npt/2005NPTmalaysia-wp.htm>

4. North Korea

North Korea may also be a potentially disruptive issue at the RevCon. It was generally felt that there was not much that could be done through the NPT Review Conference to directly respond to the developments in North Korea, but that the six nation talks had the best chance of making some progress. On the other hand, there was interest in the German proposal for the establishment of a procedure or mechanism within the NPT to respond in future to announced intentions to withdraw from the NPT in order to try to prevent withdrawal.

In addition, there was a feeling that the legal status of compliance and withdrawal needed to be clarified in light of assertions that North Korea, for example, was not in compliance with its NPT obligations prior to withdrawal and thus could not escape its obligations through withdrawal.

5. The 13 Practical Steps

There was a widely held perspective that the 13 disarmament steps agreed at the 2005 NPT Review Conference should remain as agreed and not re-visited. Rather the emphasis should be on consideration of aspects of these steps which can be implemented in the current political climate, and how to build the political climate for implementation of the others. There was a contrary viewpoint that the strategic environment has changed since 2000 rendering some of the 13 steps no longer relevant. MPI shares the former perspective.

6. Balance of non-proliferation and disarmament goals

There were perspectives that non-proliferation goals are more important and urgent in 2005 than disarmament goals, that 2000 was focused primarily on disarmament and thus 2005 should focus primarily on non-proliferation, and that non-proliferation obligations are more immediate than disarmament obligations, i.e. non-proliferation must be prevented now, whereas disarmament obligations will need to be implemented slowly over a long period of time.

However, a more widely-held perspective was that a balance between non-proliferation and disarmament goals must be reached at the 2005 Review Conference if there is to be hope that sustainable progress can be made on either front.

7. Relationship between NPT and other non-proliferation mechanisms

Since 2000 there has been the development of significant non-proliferation initiatives in other forums including the Proliferation Security Initiative and UN Security Council Resolution 1540. There was general support for the role that these initiatives can play in preventing proliferation, including to non-State actors. However, there was also concern that such initiatives should not diminish the role of multilateral treaty approaches including the NPT and the proposed Convention on Nuclear Terrorism. There was interest in the ideas generated at the Atlanta Consultation about how to ensure that these initiatives were strongly connected to the NPT, including the proposal to utilize the country reports to the UNSC 1540 Committee to complement NPT reports and thus enhance transparency.

8. Specific disarmament and non-proliferation goals

The following four of MPI's 11 practical and achievable recommendations received the most interest in the countries the delegation visited:

(a) States should begin and rapidly conclude negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons in accordance with the 1995 statement of the Special Coordinator and the mandate contained therein, with the understanding that negotiations can and should address a range of issues, including dealing with existing military materials. As soon as possible a technical advisory panel should be created to assist with issues regarding verification of the treaty.

(b) In addition, states should work to develop a global inventory of weapons-useable fissile materials and warheads, and the nuclear weapon states should accelerate placing their "excess" military fissile materials under international verification. States should seriously consider proposals to ban production of all weapons-usable fissile materials, and to establish multilateral controls on uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technology and a moratorium on supply and acquisition in the meantime.

(c) Prior to or at the Review Conference, a firm agreement should be reached on a program of work in the Conference on Disarmament that includes a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament. Achieving such an agreement in advance would greatly enhance the prospects for a cooperative outcome to the conference. Should it not prove possible to overcome the deadlock on a program of work, alternative venues should be pursued.

(d) Nuclear weapon states should implement their commitment to decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems ("de-alerting") by planning and executing a program to stand down their nuclear forces, culminating in a global stand-down by the 2010 Review Conference.

Other recommendations from the Atlanta Consultation Report which were of interest included those on nuclear testing and the legal, technical and political requirements for nuclear abolition.

Though there was universal acknowledgement that the current policies and practices of the U.S., India, Pakistan and North Korea make entry into force of the CTBT unlikely in the near future, there was universal support for continuing to observe the moratorium on nuclear testing, fund the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization, and support completion of the International Monitoring System.

The interest in legal, technical and political requirements for nuclear abolition included a focus on:

- i. verification developments including continuation and widening of the U.K. work on verification,
- ii. transparency including more robust reporting and the development of inventories for fissile materials and nuclear weapons, and

- iii. plans for disarmament as proposed by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace report on compliance.⁷

9. The Common Position of the European Union

One political dynamic that MPI did not fully explore in its own report was the influence and importance of the European Union's desire to have a common position going into the NPT. In nearly every country the delegation visited, priority attention was given to the importance of a common EU position. In every instance where the topic was raised, MPI noted that the EU had NWS, NNWS, NAC, and neutral States party, and cautioned that the EU common position could therefore be a sort of "lowest common denominator." MPI was assured on several occasions that this concern was shared, and that preliminary drafts of the EU position did show promise.

10. Negotiating Strategies at the NPT Review Conference

Throughout the Tour, MPI emphasized the importance of a collective strategy that combines the negotiating power of the New Agenda Coalition and the eight NATO States that supported the NAC Resolution in November, 2004. It became clear during the tour that the eight supporting NATO countries do not view themselves as a coherent group (nor did MPI suggest that they should), and there was some reluctance to have any formal relationship with the NAC. That said, MPI continued to urge certain countries, principally Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Norway, plus Canada, to reach out to the NAC, and will urge the NAC to reach out to these NATO countries as well.

⁷ Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security, By George Perkovich , Jessica Tuchman Mathews , Joseph Cirincione , Rose Gottemoeller , Jon Wolfsthal , Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 2005
<http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=16593>

APPENDIX I: DETAILED ITINERARY

1. Ottawa—February 21

MPI presented the Final Report of Atlanta II to an expert Roundtable composed of 20 persons from the government of Canada and NGO community. The roundtable was co-sponsored by MPI and four prominent Canadian organizations: Project Ploughshares, Canadian Pugwash, Physicians for Global Survival, and Lawyers for Social Responsibility. The roundtable opened with an address from Ambassador Duarte, who stayed the whole day and who also gave the closing address. Karel Koster was one of the main presenters. The Atlanta II report has been attached as an appendix to the subsequent Canadian report, which will have its own recommendations specially directed to the government of Canada. The report endorsed the Atlanta II recommendations.

Through MPI an appointment was arranged for Ambassador Duarte to meet with Deputy Prime Minister Anne McLellan, who met Ambassador Duarte and Senator Roche on behalf of Prime Minister Paul Martin, who was out of the country. Senator Roche presented copies of the Atlanta II Report to the Deputy Prime Minister who gave her assurance that the material would be studied at the Cabinet level in Canada.

MPI also worked with the Canadian organizers in a public meeting, a presentation to parliamentarians through the PNND network, and a press conference, which also featured Greg Thielmann, a U.S. Foreign Service officer for 25 years, who was responsible for doing analysis on intelligence reports. He is now working with the Arms Control Center in Washington. Mr. Thielmann also participated in the Ottawa Roundtable.

2. London—February 23-24

The MPI delegation held a press conference at the Foreign Press Association. An extended Roche interview with BBC security reporter Gordon Corera followed.

The delegation then presented the Atlanta II report to officials at the Foreign & Commonwealth Office, including: Mr. David Landesman, Head, Counter-Proliferation Department; Mr. Matthew Sheps, Assistant Director of the Nuclear and Space Counter-Proliferation and Arms Control division of the Ministry of Defence; and Ms. Freya Jackson, Head of the UN and Nuclear Disarmament Policy Section of the Foreign Office's Security Policy Department.

The delegation also presented the Atlanta II report at Parliament to members of the All-party Group on Non-proliferation, and a wider distribution of the Atlanta II report was made to MPs by local NGOs. The following day the delegation made a presentation to a meeting of British Pugwash.

The delegation was joined in London by Malcom Savidge, MP, and Carol Naughton, WMD Awareness Programme Coordinator, and was assisted by Sally Milne of the London Pugwash office and Lorna Richardson in Mr. Savidge's office.

3. Stockholm—February 25-26

The delegation participated in a two-day international conference of NGOs, opened by Dr. Hans Blix, and formally presented MPI's report to the conference.

4. Oslo—February 27-28

The MPI delegation presented the Atlanta II report to Prime Minister Kjell Magne Bondevik, who was accompanied State Secretary Odd Jostein Sæter and Senior Policy Advisor Odd-Inge Kvalheim.

The Delegation then met with MPs at the Norwegian Parliament (Stortinget). The meeting was chaired by Hon. Thorbjorn Jagland, Chair of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs. Other MPs included Mr. Vallersnes (Conservative Party), Mr. Sigmund Kroslid (Christian Party), Mr. Sfensaker (Progressive Party – the most conservative party in Norway).

Senator Roche also gave two interviews with leading Norwegian print and television journalists.

The Oslo meetings concluded with Senator Roche's keynote address to the Nobel Institute. Deputy Foreign Minister Mr. Kim Traavik gave a formal response to his address, and a lively panel discussion followed.

MPI was assisted in Oslo by local Nei til Atomvapen representatives Stine Rodmyr, Ole Kopreitan, and Terje Stokstad.

5. Brussels Part A—March 1

The Delegation's presentation to the Belgian Parliament was attended by Eloi Glorieux, Hans Diel, Koen T'Syen, Dula Van Damocha, Luc Barbe, Kris Gynch, Marc Laplasse, Hans Lammerant, and Pol D'Huyvetter. MPI's presentation happened to follow—by just a few hours—a presentation on U.S. Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe by Hans Kristiansen of the NRDC.

The meeting resulted in (1) a resolution in the Belgian Senate, currently falling behind in the agenda, would be pushed to the forthcoming week, and the President of the House would be contacted and pressured with a petition to get the resolution on the agenda there immediately as well, (2) MPs said would make efforts to get appointed to the Belgian delegation to the NPT Review Conference.

The delegation's second presentation was to an audience of about 20 people at the European Parliament. The delegation emphasized that Europe is charting a new course in its own history, and the MEPs currently serving have an opportunity to help determine what kind of Europe we will see in the future: one with nuclear weapons or one without them.

MPI's timing was auspicious, as it helped to bring additional attention to a resolution on the NPT in the European Parliament.

MPI was assisted in Brussels by local NGO colleagues Pol d'Huyvetter (For Mother Earth), Hans Lammerant (Forum voor Vredesactie), Robin Bloomfield (Programme Assistant Quaker Council for European Affairs) and Ernst Gulcher (Green Party).

6. The Hague—March 2-3

The Delegation, joined by Jonathan Granoff and Amb. Robert Grey, presented the Atlanta II report to the Clingendael Institute during a half-day conference with participants including the former Prime Minister of the Netherlands, Members of Parliament, government representatives, members of the press, and other influential personages in Dutch foreign policy. Additional speakers included Ambassador Robert Grey, Jonathan Granoff, Ambassador Jaap Ramaker, Dr. Karel Koster and Ambassador Chris Sanders, the Dutch Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament.

Major themes addressed included: (a) the definition of success and/or failure at the NPT Review Conference, (b) the presence of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, (c) the challenges facing the CTBT, (d) the role of Parliamentarians, and (e) the Dutch government's approach to the NPT RevCon.

MPI and the Clingendael Institute committed to work jointly to ensure that every member of the Dutch Parliament receive a copy of MPI's Atlanta II Final Report under a cover letter from the Clingendael. MPI also suggested that MPs ask the government to be included as members of the Dutch delegation to the NPT RevCon.

7. Brussels Part B—March 4

The delegation, joined by Ambassador Robert Grey, returned to Brussels to meet with Werner Bauwens of the Belgian Foreign Ministry. Mr. Bauwens was joined by a representative of the office of the Prime Minister for a portion of the meeting.

The delegation then went to NATO Headquarters for a series of meetings, including an informal luncheon with several political officers representing the Allies, then a formal briefing for staff, followed by a special meeting with Mr. Ted Whiteside, the Director of NATO's Weapons of Mass Destruction section. In NATO the delegation observed a much stronger emphasis on non-proliferation aspects of the NPT. Copies of the Atlanta II report were left with NATO's international staff, who committed to bringing it to the attention of all 26 NATO allies under their own cover.

8. Rome—March 7

The delegation met first with Minister Plenipotentiary Antonio Catalano de Melilli, the MFA Coordinator for Security, Disarmament and Non-proliferation, Mr. Giovanni Iannuzzi, Head of Nuclear and Chemical Disarmament Implementation Division, and Mr. Paolo Cuccli on the MFA staff. The government took note of MPI's suggestion that MPs be invited to join the Italian delegation to the NPT.

Following the meeting with the Foreign Ministry, the delegation met with Senator Francesco Martone for a discussion on concrete actions that could take place in the Italian Parliament. The following immediate actions steps emerged as high priority: (1) a resolution within one week's time, in order to influence the government position, (2) the immediate posing of parliamentary questions, (3) a letter to all MPs encouraging participation in PNND, and (4) an effort to address the issue of TNW in Europe immediately following the Review Conference (perhaps June).

MPI was assisted in Rome by local NGO colleagues Jo Lau (IALANA), Fabio Marcelli (IALANA), Chiara Venturi (IPB), and Fulgida Baratoni (IPB).

9. Berlin—March 8-9

The delegation met with Uta Zapf, Chair of the Foreign Relations committee of the Bundestag, and Mr. Reider, MP. Senator Roche also held a press luncheon with several reporters, including the political reporter for Financial Times Deutschland.

Following a one-hour meeting with Ambassador Friedrich Gröning, Deputy Commissioner for Arms Control and Disarmament, the delegation held a 25 minute meeting with German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, who was well-briefed on MPI. MPI emphasized to Minister Fischer the critical leadership role Germany could play during the NPT Review Conference.

MPI was assisted in Berlin by local NGO colleague Xanthe Hall of IPPNW Germany.

10. Post-tour meetings: Canberra and Wellington

After the Delegation ended its NATO portion of the tour in Berlin, Alyn Ware went to Australia and New Zealand where he presented the Atlanta II report to foreign ministry officials and members of parliament in Canberra and Wellington.

APPENDIX II: MPI'S "ATLANTA II" RECOMMENDATIONS

The Middle Powers Initiative recommends the following policy options to states party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) for their consideration:

1. A successful outcome of the Review Conference depends on its ability to address equally every aspect of the Treaty. The strengthening of the commitments contained in the NPT regarding nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament should be done in a balanced way.
2. The Review Conference must refer to the substance of the consensus decisions from the 1995 and 2000 Conferences, including the 13 Practical Steps adopted in 2000 and the Resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995.
3. The United States and Russia should build upon their progress in the Moscow Treaty by applying the principles of transparency, irreversibility, and verification to reductions under the Treaty, and by negotiating further deep, verified, and irreversible cuts in their total arsenals, encompassing both warheads and delivery systems.
4. Russia and the United States should engage in a wider process of control of their non-strategic weapons, through formalization and verification of the 1991-1992 initiatives, transparency steps, security measures, U.S. withdrawal of its bombs deployed on the territories of NATO countries, and commencement of negotiations regarding further reduction/elimination of non-strategic weapons.
5. Nuclear weapon states should implement their commitment to decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems ("de-alerting") by planning and executing a program to stand down their nuclear forces, culminating in a global stand-down by the 2010 Review Conference.
6. Nuclear weapon states should further implement their commitment to diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in their security policies by not researching or developing modified or new nuclear weapons and by beginning negotiations on a legally-binding instrument on the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states party to the NPT.
7. States should begin and rapidly conclude negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons in accordance with the 1995 statement of the Special Coordinator and the mandate contained therein, with the understanding that negotiations can and should address a range of issues, including dealing with existing military materials. As soon as possible a technical advisory panel should be created to assist with issues regarding verification of the treaty. In addition, states should work to develop a global inventory of weapons-useable fissile materials and warheads, and the nuclear weapon states should accelerate placing their "excess" military fissile materials under international verification. States should seriously consider proposals to ban production of all weapons-usable fissile materials, and to establish multilateral controls on uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technology and a moratorium on supply and acquisition in the meantime.

8. Adherence to the Additional Protocol on Safeguards should become a universal standard for compliance with non-proliferation obligations and treatment as a member in good standing of the NPT with access to nuclear fuel.

9. Prior to or at the Review Conference, a firm agreement should be reached on a program of work in the Conference on Disarmament that includes a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament. Achieving such an agreement in advance would greatly enhance the prospects for a cooperative outcome to the conference. Should it not prove possible to overcome the deadlock on a program of work, alternative venues should be pursued.

10. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty should be brought into force at an early date. In the meantime, states should continue to observe the moratorium on nuclear testing, fund the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization, and support completion of the International Monitoring System.

11. States should use the opportunity provided by the NPT review process to build upon the 13 Practical Steps to undertake deeper consideration of the legal, political and technical requirements for the elimination of nuclear weapons, in order to identify steps that could be taken unilaterally, bilaterally, and multilaterally that would lead to complete nuclear disarmament. The United Kingdom's initiative on verification, the New Agenda Coalition's proposals on security assurances and the strengthening and expanding of Nuclear Weapon Free Zones are positive examples in this regard. Such consideration should include the investigation of means to enhance security without relying on nuclear weapons.