Canadian Pugwash Group

Chair: Dr. Adele Buckley, Toronto; Deputy Chair: Prof. Walter Dorn, Toronto;  Secretary: Prof. Sergei Plekhanov, Toronto;  Treasurer: Dr. Erika Simpson, Victoria; Directors: Prof. (emeritus) Peter Meincke, Ottawa; Prof. Peter Walker, Wolfville, NS;  Prof. (emeritus) Derek Paul, Toronto

 

June 4, 2004

 

The Honourable Bill Graham

Minister of Foreign Affairs

Foreign Affairs Canada

125 Sussex Drive, Ottawa, ON   

K1A 0G2

 

The Honourable David Pratt                                                                                        
Minister of National Defence
National Defence Headquarters
Major-General George R. Pearkes Building
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0K2

 

Another perspective on BMD - Lessons of Bomarc

 

Dear Ministers Graham and Pratt:

 

As you are both preparing for the federal election, the moment is appropriate to draw to your attention an election issue of the 1960s – the nuclear arming of the Bomarc missiles.  My colleagues Dr. Derek Manchester and Dr. Lynn Trainor have just published “Martin government should apply lessons of Bomarc to Bush’s NMD” in the March 2004 issue of The CCPA Monitor, and I am enclosing a copy for your review.  The Bomarc lesson is that, before a major policy decision, a government needs scientific and technological advice from sources that are outside organizational structures closely linked to government. 

 

As with the Bomarc, highly capable scientists have stated that there are serious issues of technical feasibility of the present BMD. (See also the January 14 letter, and attachments, to Minister Pratt from Canadian Pugwash).  The American Physical Society study on boost-phase intercept (BPI) has concluded that BMD has only limited applicability for defence against slow liquid-propelled ICBMs and will not be viable against solid propellant ICBMs.

 

You already know that there is wide opposition in Canada to BMD; nevertheless, we have begun to participate in the ongoing activity with the U.S. BMD is not technically feasible.  Moreover, there is a very poor cost-benefit from the required huge expenditure. Considering all of this, we should not expose our country to the inevitable failure of BMD program to achieve the technical breakthroughs to bring it to practical functionality. 

 

While we do not know the full extent of the advisory input of the scientific community that the Government has already received, there seems to be a disconnect between the technical information and policy decisions to date.   At the very least, the Government of Canada should do the following:

  • Ensure that it receives the advice from well-respected scientific and technical experts, whose position is truly independent from scientific input received through any government connected organization.

  • Review independent material originated in the U.S., such as the study report of the American Physical Society, conducted by a distinguished group of scientific experts.  In addition, be aware of serious drawbacks expressed in U.S. studies such as the report from the U.S. General Accounting Office “Missile Defense – Additional Knowledge Needed in Developing a System for Intercepting Long-Range Missiles” August 2003. [The full GAO report can be found here: http://www.fas.org/spp/military/program/track/gao-03-600.pdf ].

  • Implement the Trainor and Manchester suggestion that objective evaluations of policy questions can be achieved through an Office of Technology Assessment, along the lines currently functioning in many European countries.

 

Sincerely

 

 

Dr. Adele Buckley,

Physicist

Chair, Canadian Pugwash Group

 

Cc:

    

Dr. Derek Manchester

Dr. Lynn Trainor

Canadian Pugwash Group members

 

Encl.