

**Building Bridges: The Non-Proliferation
Treaty and Canada's Nuclear Weapons Policies**

A Policy Paper for the Government of Canada

**Prepared by
The Canadian Pugwash Group
and
The Middle Powers Initiative**

March 2004

The Canadian Pugwash Group (CPG) is the Canadian affiliate of Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs. The Pugwash Conferences take their name from the location of the first meeting, which was held in 1957 in the village of Pugwash, Nova Scotia, Canada, birthplace of the American philanthropist Cyrus Eaton, who hosted the meeting. Best known for its work on nuclear disarmament, Pugwash is concerned with all causes of global insecurity. World peace and promotion of change to advance the cause of peace are the focus of Pugwash. In 1995 the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs won the Nobel Peace Prize. CPG holds seminars and forums and published briefing papers. The CPG website is <http://www.pugwashgroup.ca>

The Middle Powers Initiative (MPI), founded in 1998 as a coalition of eight international non-governmental organizations specializing in nuclear disarmament issues, is a highly effective global catalyst in promoting practical steps toward the total elimination of nuclear weapons. MPI educates policy-makers around the world about the importance of nuclear disarmament by sending formal delegations to capitals, organizing strategy consultations for diplomats at the UN and in other fora, and disseminating briefing papers. Two of its founding members, the International Peace Bureau and International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, have been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. MPI operates as a program of the Global Security Institute <http://www.gsinitute.org> and works closely with parliamentarians and NGOs in key middle power countries. MPI's website is <http://www.middlepowers.org>

CPG and MPI wish to thank Bill Robinson, Rapporteur, and Evelyn Dumas, Translator.

Canadian Pugwash Group (CPG) Middle Powers Initiative (MPI)

March 19, 2004

The Rt. Hon. Paul Martin, P.C., M.P.
Prime Minister of Canada
Room 309-S, Centre Block
House of Commons
O t t a w a

Dear Prime Minister,


We have the honour to send to you a Policy Paper, "Building Bridges: The Non-Proliferation Treaty and Canada's Nuclear Weapons Policies," prepared by the Canadian Pugwash Group and the Middle Powers Initiative. Canada needs urgently to develop a policy response to the profound crisis of the nuclear disarmament agenda. The Paper makes proposals to the Government of Canada in preparation for the 2005 Review of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Recommendations by States Parties to the NPT are to be made at a meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the Review to be held at the United Nations, New York, April 26-May 7, 2004. Thus this Policy Paper is timely.

The Paper is informed by the views of 30 invited experts at a Roundtable held February 26-27, 2004 in Ottawa. The Hon. Maurice Strong, Personal Envoy of the U.N. Secretary-General to the Korean Peninsula, was the Keynote Speaker. Subsequent sessions dealt with challenges to the NPT, NATO nuclear policy, ballistic missile defence, and Canada's role in nuclear disarmament.

The Roundtable was sponsored by the Canadian Pugwash Group (CPG) and the Middle Powers Initiative (MPI), with the financial assistance of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. CPG and MPI take responsibility for the views expressed in the Policy Paper. Both organizations hope the Paper will be of value to the Government of Canada.

With best wishes, we remain,

Yours sincerely,



Adele Buckley, Ph.D.
Chair, Canadian Pugwash Group

Douglas Roche

Douglas Roche, O.C., Senator
Chair, Middle Powers Initiative

c.c. Hon. Bill Graham, P.C., M.P.
Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Trade

Hon. David Pratt, P.C., M.P.
Minster of National Defence

Executive Summary

Canada's nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation policy is built upon two premises:

- The elimination of nuclear weapons is “the only sustainable strategy for the future”; and
- The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is “the most effective international instrument to achieve Canada's fundamental objectives of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.”

Continuing failures to effectively implement the NPT's disarmament and non-proliferation obligations have thrown the Treaty, and the entire arms control regime, into a profound crisis. Canada needs urgently to develop a policy response to this crisis. Canadian disarmament policy is hindered by support for NATO security policy, which asserts that NATO must retain nuclear weapons for the “foreseeable future”. In effect, Canada has found itself forced to argue that the “only sustainable strategy for the future” cannot be pursued for the “foreseeable future”. But NATO policy can be seen as an opportunity as well as a constraint. As both a member of NATO and a strong supporter of nuclear disarmament, Canada can help to build a bridge between the nuclear-weapon states and the non-nuclear-weapon states, working both to preserve and strengthen the NPT at the forthcoming 2005 NPT Review Conference and to make progress toward a nuclear-weapon-free world through full implementation of the commitments made at the 1995 and 2000 NPT Review Conferences, including the 13 practical steps.

In support of these objectives, the Canadian Pugwash Group and the Middle Powers Initiative recommend that Canada **take a leading role to energize global dialogue on nuclear weapons, work to build bridges in the nuclear debate, and minimize the negative consequences of missile defence deployment.**

Among other initiatives, Canada should:

- **Offer to host an international conference at the Heads of State and Government level to identify ways to eliminate the nuclear threat;**
- **Seek agreement within NATO to reform alliance nuclear policies, and publicly advocate adoption of a no-first-use policy, elimination of NATO nuclear-sharing arrangements, withdrawal of nuclear weapons to national territory, and reduction and early elimination of non-strategic nuclear weapons;**
- **Organize regular meetings between NATO states, New Agenda Coalition states, and other key non-nuclear-weapon states to develop and advocate common positions;**
- **Decide against participation in the U.S. missile defence system because it is not configured in a manner consistent with Canadian disarmament and non-proliferation interests and prevention of weaponization of space; and**
- **Pursue an accidental nuclear war prevention initiative, including a No-Launch-on-Warning agreement or pledges, physical de-alerting/accidental launch prevention measures, and global missile launch warning/false alarm prevention measures.**

Building Bridges: The Non-Proliferation Treaty and Canada's Nuclear Weapons Policies

A. Introduction

1. The future of nuclear weapons is intimately tied to the future of security policy. Will states continue to treat security primarily as a zero-sum game, governed by unilateral, national interests and selfish, short-term calculations? Or will security increasingly be seen as a global, co-operative endeavour, to be pursued within a framework of international laws, universal rights, and global responsibilities? The first approach views nuclear weapons as the “supreme guarantee” of security – at least for those states that have succeeded in obtaining them. The second approach, which is the model of security now advocated by Canada and many other states,¹ recognizes nuclear weapons to be the antithesis of security, standing in fundamental contradiction to international and humanitarian law and threatening the indiscriminate destruction of human life and the natural environment.

2. The most promising instrument for ridding the world of nuclear weapons is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which commits its parties to “pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.”²

3. The continuing failure of states to act on this commitment has created a global nuclear crisis that threatens to undermine and ultimately sweep away the NPT and the broader arms control regime. Canada and other states need to develop a policy response to this crisis, in order both to preserve and strengthen the NPT and to make progress toward the elimination of nuclear weapons.

4. This paper is about that policy response. It is about building a bridge between the member states of NATO and those of the New Agenda Coalition (NAC)³ to strengthen the centre in the nuclear weapons debate. It is about building a bridge between the nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear-weapon States to open the road to substantive disarmament and non-proliferation progress. It is about building a bridge to enable humanity to cross the abyss of nuclear holocaust that, despite everything that has happened since the end of the Cold War, lies waiting to destroy everything we know and have ever known. It is about building a bridge to a nuclear-weapons-free future. And it is about the role that Canada can and should play as one of the builders of those bridges.

¹ Canada uses the term “Human Security” to denote this approach to security. For more information about this approach, see <http://www.humansecuritynetwork.org/menu-e.php>.

² The text of the Non-Proliferation Treaty is online at <http://reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/npttext.html>. For a discussion of the relationship between nuclear weapons and international law, see the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, rendered 8 July 1996 (<http://212.153.43.18/icjwww/icasess/iunan/iunanframe.htm>).

³ The NAC includes Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, and Sweden.

B. The global nuclear crisis

5. The range of challenges facing the NPT is extensive and can only be summarized in this paper. These challenges include:

- a) *Non-compliance by the nuclear-weapon States (NWS)*: The five NPT-bound NWS have taken no direct steps toward fulfillment of their primary obligation as stated in Article VI, the negotiation of effective measures related to the elimination of their nuclear arsenals. Worse, three have indicated that such negotiations will not be pursued “for the foreseeable future”. Important elements of the 1995 bargain for the permanent extension of the NPT and of the commitments made in the *Final Document* of the 2000 Review Conference remain unfulfilled and have in some cases been repudiated by some of the NWS. The START II Treaty is dead, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty has been scrapped, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is not yet in force (and one NWS, although a signatory, has stated that it “will not become a party” to the treaty), and no progress has been made on new measures such as a Fissile Materials Cutoff Treaty.⁴ Though both the U.S. and Russia are committed to reducing their nuclear arsenals under the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty of 2002, the planned reductions will occur in a non-transparent, reversible, and non-verifiable fashion. Even if the reductions are fully implemented, thousands of weapons will remain in the U.S. and Russian arsenals, including hundreds deployed on high alert. At least three of the NWS also continue to engage in forms of vertical proliferation, including the deployment of new or modernized nuclear weapons, development of new nuclear weapon technologies (e.g., “mini-nukes” and “bunker busters”), and/or modification of nuclear doctrines to expand the role of nuclear weapons. Finally, the proposed deployment of missile defences/space weapons threatens to slow or halt further reductions and even spur increases in the arsenals of some NWS.

- b) *Non-compliance by non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWS)*: In recent years, a small number of NNWS parties to the NPT have violated the Treaty by pursuing acquisition of nuclear weapons. These states include Iraq (which had its secret nuclear program dismantled after the first U.S.-led Gulf War), Libya (which recently agreed to disclose and dismantle its clandestine program), and North Korea (which is thought to possess nuclear weapons already and which recently withdrew from the NPT).⁵ Serious concerns also have been raised about a possible secret nuclear weapons program in Iran.

- c) *Contradictory policies*: Despite being signatories of the NPT, the 16 (soon to be 23) NNWS members of NATO implicitly rely on nuclear weapons in their

⁴ As Prof. Sergei Plekhanov commented at the Roundtable, “The Cold War left a legacy of weapons and treaties. Now that the Cold War is over, we’re dismantling the treaties, not the weapons.”

⁵ The possibility of a diplomatic resolution to the Korean crisis was the subject of the Hon. Maurice Strong’s keynote address to the Roundtable on 26 February 2004. For information about the Roundtable, including video of the keynote address and texts of the presentations made (when available), see the Canadian Pugwash Group website (<http://pugwashgroup.ca>).

defence policy and formally support the retention of nuclear weapons “for the foreseeable future.” Six of these states participate in nuclear-sharing arrangements, under which they host nuclear weapons during peacetime and are prepared to use them in accordance with NATO policy. Forty-four parties to the NPT have thus far failed to conclude safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and only 39 have brought into force additional protocols on the basis of the IAEA’s Model Protocol Additional to Safeguards Agreements. Many nuclear supplier states have failed to implement effective national export controls and/or physical security over nuclear-related technology and materials. Supplier states continue to reject the establishment of a legally binding, universal export control regime. The IAEA is insufficiently funded, and its role in monitoring and verifying compliance with NPT-related obligations is being undermined by some states. Meanwhile, unilateralist efforts to use coercive and even pre-emptive measures to enforce the compliance of some states and not others threaten to undermine the institutional and normative framework necessary for long-term success of the NPT.

- d) *Non-membership*: Three states – Israel, India, and Pakistan – remain outside the NPT, having never undertaken any nuclear disarmament treaty obligation. All three possess nuclear weapons. In 2003, North Korea, which is also suspected of having a nuclear weapons capability, announced its withdrawal from the Treaty.
- e) *Institutional weaknesses*: The NPT lacks a permanent secretariat, and the documentary record of its review proceedings is scattered and incomplete. The Treaty’s accountability mechanisms are embryonic; review proceedings lack interactivity; reporting of compliance-related activities by most States parties remains inadequate; and implementation of the Treaty is undermined by imprecision and disagreement with respect to what constitutes compliance and how compliance should be ensured. Opportunities for civil society oversight and participation are inadequate. The NPT also suffers from weaknesses of the broader arms control and disarmament regime.
- f) *Global and regional conflicts*: Chronic global and regional conflicts have created strong nuclear proliferation pressures in northeast Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East. If left unresolved, these problems could lead to further horizontal and vertical proliferation in these regions and elsewhere.
- g) *Technological advances*: Long-term advances in, and diffusion of, technological capabilities may have the effect of progressively lowering the bar to acquisition of nuclear or possible future nuclear-scale weapons of mass destruction (WMD), threatening to destabilize the non-proliferation regime.

7. All of these challenges demand the active attention of the global community.

C. Canada's nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation policy

8. Canada's nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation policy is built upon two fundamental premises: first, that the elimination of nuclear weapons entirely is "the only sustainable strategy for the future" and, second, that the Non-Proliferation Treaty, with its mutually reinforcing and interdependent set of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation obligations, is "the most effective international instrument to achieve Canada's fundamental objectives of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation" and is therefore "the central instrument in which Canada's nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation policy is rooted".

9. The Canadian government has focused considerable attention on its nuclear non-proliferation, arms control, and disarmament policies during the past six years, most notably in the December 1998 report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada and the Nuclear Challenge*,⁶ and the April 1999 reply of the government, which came in the form of a policy statement and a separate response to the specific recommendations of the committee.⁷ These documents constitute an important statement of Canadian nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation policies, and they add a number of significant new elements to those policies.

10. The key elements of Canadian nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation policy can be summarized as follows:⁸

- a) The elimination of nuclear weapons entirely is a legal obligation of states under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the only sustainable strategy for the future.
- b) The political value of nuclear weapons must be reduced to open the way toward their elimination.
- c) Pending their elimination, the only appropriate function of nuclear weapons is to deter the use by others of nuclear weapons. The negative security assurances⁹ provided by nuclear-weapon States to non-nuclear-weapon States party to the NPT reflect this fact and are a vital element in international security; they must be

⁶ *Canada and the Nuclear Challenge: Reducing the Political Value of Nuclear Weapons for the Twenty-First Century*, Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, December 1998 (<http://www.parl.gc.ca/InfoComDoc/36/1/FAIT/Studies/Reports/faitrp07-e.htm>).

⁷ *Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation: Advancing Canadian Objectives and Government Response to the Recommendations of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade on Canada's Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Policy*, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, April 1999 (<http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/nucchallenge/POLICY-en.asp> and <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/nucchallenge/ANNEXB-en.asp>, respectively).

⁸ This summary draws primarily on the two April 1999 policy documents and on *Notes for an Address by the Honourable Bill Graham, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the Conference on Disarmament*, 19 March 2002 (<http://webapps.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/minpub/>). See the April 1999 documents for details of other elements not summarized here.

⁹ Negative security assurances are undertakings given by the NWS that they will neither use nor threaten the use of nuclear weapons against any NNWS party to the NPT. These undertakings usually state that they do not apply to NNWS engaged in an act of aggression in association or alliance with an NWS.

preserved and respected. Although not stated explicitly, a logical implication of this position is that Canada does not support first-use of nuclear weapons, either in response to use of chemical and biological weapons or for any other reason.

- d) The elimination of nuclear weapons is most likely to be achieved through a step-by-step approach. In line with this approach, Canada supports full and effective implementation of the 13 practical steps agreed to at the 2000 NPT Review Conference.
- e) Among these interim steps, Canada considers negotiation of a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices to be a priority. Such a treaty, which must be matched by parallel undertakings to reduce and eventually eliminate existing stockpiles of fissile material, would serve both disarmament and non-proliferation objectives.
- f) Another priority is entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.
- g) Nuclear arsenals should be de-alerted and de-mated “to the maximum extent possible”. Although not stated explicitly, this position might be extended to include support for confidence and security building measures related to ruling out “launch on warning” options by the NWS.
- h) Canada (like other states) has a role to play in cleaning up the legacy of the Cold War and preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and other materials usable in weapons of mass destruction.¹⁰
- i) Canada supports discussions on prevention of an arms race in outer space at the Conference on Disarmament and believes that outer space should remain free of weapons.¹¹
- j) Full and effective functioning of the NPT review process requires further elaboration of a “culture of accountability” among States parties, including such elements as detailed and systematic reporting on implementation of the NPT, improved institutional arrangements, and improved NGO access to the process.

11. Standing in contrast to these disarmament and non-proliferation policies is Canada’s support for NATO nuclear policy. The long-standing tensions between Canada’s disarmament priorities and the nuclear policies of its allies were especially prominent in the April 1999 statements, which coincided with and were heavily influenced by the

¹⁰ Most notably in this regard, Canada committed in 2002 to spend up to \$1 billion over 10 years in support of the Global Partnership Program, a G8 initiative designed to support the destruction of chemical weapons, dismantlement of nuclear submarines, nuclear and radiological security, and employment of former weapons scientists in Russia.

¹¹ Canada also is working in partnership with the Eisenhower Institute to define the concept of space security and evaluate developments in space security. See *Space Security 2003*, Research Report Prepared for the International Security Bureau of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Ottawa, February 2004.

adoption by NATO states (including Canada) of the alliance's *Strategic Concept*.¹² While the April 1999 statements made it clear that the Canadian government favoured a reduction in the role ascribed to nuclear forces by NATO members and other states, they stopped short of directly contradicting existing NATO policy, describing the resulting compromise as “an appropriate balance” between Canada's disarmament objectives and its security requirements.¹³ Thus, for example, the Canadian government stated that “the only function of nuclear weapons is to deter the use by others of nuclear weapons,” but it declined to call on NATO to renounce the option to be first to use nuclear weapons in a conflict. Only in areas where allied policy was less fixed did the government evidently feel it had more flexibility, advocating the de-alerting and de-mating of nuclear arsenals “to the maximum extent possible”, for example.¹⁴

D. Recommendations

12. The global agenda for action on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation is spelled out in the decisions made at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference and in the commitments made by NPT States parties in the *Final Document* of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, most notably the 13 “practical steps” for systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the Treaty.¹⁵

Full implementation of the 13 practical steps

13. In support of these objectives, the Canadian Pugwash Group and the Middle Powers Initiative propose the following specific priorities for action by the Canadian government:¹⁶

- a) ***Strategic arms reductions: Canada should insist that the May 2002 U.S.-Russian strategic nuclear arms treaty be implemented in accordance with NPT principles so that reduced warheads and their delivery systems are irreversibly dismantled in a transparent and verifiable manner; further, Canada should promote the de-alerting of remaining deployed U.S. and Russian nuclear forces in accordance with the 2000 NPT Review Conference***

¹² “The Alliance's Strategic Concept,” NATO Press Communiqué NAC-S(99)65, 24 April 1999 (<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm>).

¹³ *Government Response to the Recommendations of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade on Canada's Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Policy*, p. 1.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

¹⁵ The full text of the 13 steps is reproduced as Appendix 3 of this paper.

¹⁶ This list was recommended by the Canadian Pugwash Group in April 2003: Canadian Pugwash Group, “The Only Absolute Guarantee: A Brief on Canada's Nuclear Weapons Policies,” April 2003 (<http://www.pugwashgroup.ca/events/documents/2003/paper-04-14-03.pdf>). Based on earlier recommendations by the Middle Powers Initiative, it builds on elements of existing Canadian policy, the recommendations of the New Agenda Coalition, and the priorities outlined in the “13 practical steps” agreed in the *Final Document* of the 2000 Review Conference of the NPT. For further discussion, see Middle Powers Initiative, “Advancing the NPT 13 Practical Steps,” MPI Briefing Paper, April 2003 (http://www.middlepowers.org/mpj/pubs/13steps_0403.pdf).

commitment to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems.

- b) ***Control of missile defences and non-proliferation of missiles:*** Canada should work to prevent missile defence deployments that are inconsistent with Canadian disarmament and non-proliferation interests and prevention of weaponization of space; Canada should help prevent missile proliferation through ad hoc arrangements and through developing proposals for a missile flight test moratorium and missile control regimes combining disarmament and non-proliferation objectives.
- c) ***Tactical arms reductions:*** Canada should call for the removal of U.S. bombs deployed under NATO auspices in Europe; in addition, Canada should help create a wider process of control of U.S. and Russian tactical weapons, including through reporting on the 1991-1992 Presidential initiatives. It should also ask that those initiatives be formalized, including measures for verification. In accordance with NATO proposals, Canada should also support the reciprocal exchange of information regarding readiness, safety, and number of sub-strategic forces. Finally, Canada should encourage the initiation of U.S.-Russian negotiations on the reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons.
- d) ***Non-use of nuclear weapons:*** Canada should call upon the NWS to reverse trends toward the expansion of options for use of nuclear weapons, including against non-nuclear weapon countries, exemplified by the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review; Canada should, together with other middle power countries in multilateral or bilateral security alliances with the United States, refuse to participate in or support the first use of nuclear weapons or preparations for such use.
- e) ***Ban on nuclear testing:*** Canada should call upon the NWS to observe the moratorium on nuclear testing and help achieve the early entry into force of the CTBT; further, it should ask the NWS to renounce the development of new or modified nuclear weapons as they are contrary to the 2000 commitment to a diminishing role of nuclear weapons in security policies and the Article VI obligation of cessation of the nuclear arms race.
- f) ***Control of fissile materials:*** Building on heightened awareness of the threat of terrorist use of nuclear devices and materials, Canada should help create a process of accounting for and control of fissile materials holdings on a worldwide basis in accordance with NPT principles of transparency, irreversibility and verification, with the objective of establishing a global inventory of all weapon-usable fissile materials and nuclear weapons; commence negotiations on a fissile materials ban; Canada should also set an example by increasing funding of the IAEA eight-point plan to improve protection of nuclear materials and facilities against acts of terrorism.

14. The full implementation of these important steps will require the concerted long-term effort of the entire international community. For the years preceding and immediately following the 2005 NPT Review Conference, a number of short-term disarmament and non-proliferation actions could help prepare the ground for the full implementation of the 13 practical steps.

15. In support of these priorities, Canada should undertake the following initiatives related to global dialogue on nuclear weapons, NATO nuclear policy, missile defence, and nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation as a whole over the next several years.

Initiatives related to global dialogue and the 2005 NPT Review Conference

16. One immediate requirement is to **increase the level and intensity of effort, attention, and dialogue on the part of governments and the global public on controlling and eliminating the nuclear threat.** It is essential that governments and individuals assign a much higher priority to addressing the nuclear threat, that heads of state and government personally engage on the issue, and that the global community as a whole acts to stigmatize and devalue the possession of nuclear weapons by all states. As Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament Paul Meyer told the Roundtable, “Once the mature nuclear powers stop treating these weapons as crucial to their security or standing in the world, a potent motivation for others to acquire or retain them will disappear. Once the leading powers stop attributing political status to those possessing nuclear weapons, when they are viewed as liabilities rather than assets in a country’s international standing and level of development, then we will witness a sea-change in global security and the creation of a new nuclear disarmament imperative.”¹⁷

17. With respect to global dialogue on nuclear weapons and the 2005 Review Conference, Canada should take the following steps:

- a) Work to build support for an international conference, preferably at the Heads of State and Government level, to identify ways to eliminate the nuclear threat, as proposed by U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan in his report for the U.N. Millennium Summit,¹⁸ by sponsoring a resolution at the U.N. and offering to host the conference in Canada.¹⁹**

¹⁷ Ambassador Paul Meyer, “Canada’s Role in Nuclear Disarmament,” Presentation to CPG-MPI Roundtable, 27 February 2004, available at the Canadian Pugwash Group website (<http://www.pugwashgroup.ca/>).

¹⁸ Kofi Annan, *We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century*, April 2000, p. 53 (<http://www.un.org/millennium/sg/report/full.htm>).

¹⁹ The Canadian Pugwash Group recommended that the Canadian government support and offer to host such a conference in its submission to the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade’s recent Dialogue on Foreign Policy (Canadian Pugwash Group, “The Only Absolute Guarantee: A Brief on Canada’s Nuclear Weapons Policies,” April 2003).

- b) **Support the work of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission set up by Sweden.**²⁰
- c) **Continue efforts to pursue further elaboration of a “Culture of Accountability” within the NPT regime, including inclusion in the *Final Document* of the 2005 Review Conference of greater definition of the reporting requirement, provision for greater NGO access, and provision for greater interactivity during the review process.**²¹
- d) **Draft and circulate a “model report” from which other States parties can draw if they choose, as part of a broader effort to encourage and support other States parties in preparing formal reports to NPT sessions, with the goal of increasing the number and quality of reports provided and helping to further embed and deepen the reporting norm within the NPT.**²²
- e) **Propose the creation of a permanent secretariat for the NPT to improve operation of the review process and ensure timely availability of review documentation.**²³ Since it is likely to take many years to build a consensus among NPT States parties to create such a body, Canada should also establish and host in the meantime an unofficial NPT documentation centre to fulfill some of the duties that a secretariat would eventually undertake, notably to collect and make available the reports submitted by States parties, other Review Conference and Preparatory Committee documents and papers, and collateral information and analysis, and to provide support for greater analysis of this information. Such a centre (and its website) might also be used to advance work on other areas related to the elimination of nuclear weapons, such as verification techniques, and to address areas outside the scope of the NPT review process, such as the programs of non-NPT states.²⁴

²⁰ Recommended by the Canadian Pugwash Group in “Canadian Pugwash Statement: Canada’s Response to the New Nuclear Weapons Dangers,” 27 September 2003. Dr. Jennifer Simons informed the Roundtable that the Simons Centre has undertaken to sponsor the Commission’s third meeting, which will be held on 9-11 November 2004. The Commission was established by Sweden in December 2003 (for more information, see http://www.utrikes.regeringen.se/pdf/wmdc_info.pdf).

²¹ These items are already established elements of Canadian policy, but their usefulness is worth reiterating. For more on these issues, see *Transparency with accountability: Reporting by States party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*, Roundtable on Reporting by States party to the NPT, Ottawa, 19-20 June 2003, Bill Robinson, Rapporteur, September 2003. See also the report on the 2002 roundtable on the same subject: *Reporting by States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*, NPT Reporting Roundtable, Ottawa, 8-9 January 2002, Bill Robinson, Rapporteur, February 2002.

²² Suggestion made at the Roundtable on Reporting by States party to the NPT, Ottawa, 19-20 June 2003.

²³ Ambassador Paul Meyer informed the CPG-MPI Roundtable that Canada intends to suggest the creation of a permanent secretariat, along with other improvements to the review process, at the next PrepCom meeting.

²⁴ A possible model for such a centre is the unofficial Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) website developed by the Government of Canada and administered by the Department of Peace Studies of the University of Bradford. This website (<http://www.opbw.org>) functions as an information clearinghouse for work related to the BTWC, and serves as a placeholder for the Organization for the Prohibition of

- f) **Open a dialogue with other states and the public on how to address NPT compliance concerns – both horizontal and vertical – using mechanisms that reinforce multilateral institutions for conflict resolution and the international rule of law, rather than undermine them. Discussion topics might include improved safeguards, transparency measures, inspection procedures and other verification techniques, and the appropriate fora for raising and resolving compliance concerns (including concerns about the activities of non-parties).**
- g) **Provide support for public education about nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, in line with the recommendations of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade (1998)²⁵ and the U.N. Study on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education (2002)²⁶, in order to raise the level of public engagement and information on these issues.**

Bridging the gap: Initiatives related to NATO nuclear policy

18. A major impediment to progress is the polarization of the nuclear debate between the nuclear-weapon States, which tend to focus on non-proliferation at the expense of disarmament, and the non-nuclear-weapon States, many of which tend to focus on disarmament at the expense of non-proliferation. As a result of this polarization, there is at present a near-total absence of effective global discussion of the future of nuclear weapons.

19. Between these poles, however, sit groups of states – notably several of the NNWS members of NATO, which support their NWS allies but also bring strong support for disarmament to the table, and the members of the New Agenda Coalition, which include strong support for non-proliferation efforts within their disarmament advocacy.²⁷ These states, which occupy positions more toward the centre of the nuclear debate, may hold the key to bridging the gap between the NWS and the NNWS, thus unlocking the door to long-term disarmament and non-proliferation progress.

Biological Weapons that may one day exist, paralleling the existing Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (<http://www.opcw.org>). The web address www.opnw.org is available for use for a virtual Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons; Physicians for Global Survival (Canada) registered the address in 2003 for this purpose.

²⁵ *Canada and the Nuclear Challenge: Reducing the Political Value of Nuclear Weapons for the Twenty-First Century*, Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, December 1998, Recommendation 3.

²⁶ *United Nations Study on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education*, U.N. document A/57/124, October 2002 (<http://disarmament2.un.org/education/study.html>).

²⁷ See, for example, “Statement by Ambassador Sergio Q. Duarte, Ambassador-at-Large of Brazil for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation,” Presentation to CPG-MPI Roundtable, 27 February 2004, available at the Canadian Pugwash Group website (<http://www.pugwashgroup.ca>): “Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation are the two sides of the same coin; it is not feasible nor constructive to deal with one without equal stress on the other. Efforts aiming at strengthening the non-proliferation regime will not be politically or pragmatically sustainable in the absence of effective disarmament measures with a view to the total elimination of nuclear weapons.”

20. However, while a number of NATO NNWS are strongly supportive of centrist positions in the nuclear debate, the security policy of the NATO alliance remains strongly opposed to nuclear disarmament.

21. Among other points, NATO security policy asserts that:

- a) The “supreme guarantee” of alliance security is the possession of nuclear weapons by the nuclear members of NATO; the military security of NATO’s members relies ultimately not on peaceful, stable relations or even on conventional military strength, no matter how superior, but on nuclear weapons.
- b) NATO must retain the option to be the first to use nuclear weapons in any conflict; although considered “remote”, this option – a blatant contradiction of the negative security assurances that have been made by the NWS members of NATO – must never be ruled out under any circumstances.
- c) NATO must retain the right to transfer nuclear weapons to non-nuclear members of the alliance in time of war and to make preparations for such transfers in peacetime, including permanent deployment of nuclear weapons on the territory of six of its NNWS members. (These six states are the only NNWS in the world that host, and are in a position potentially to use, nuclear weapons.)²⁸
- d) These points require and justify the possession of nuclear weapons by NATO members for the “foreseeable future”.

22. The unstated implication of this policy is that the NATO states cannot and will not pursue the elimination of nuclear weapons for the foreseeable future, even if all other NWS agree on a plan to eliminate them.

23. NATO security policy is thus entirely incompatible with the obligations of the member states of NATO under the NPT. Regardless of the intent of individual NATO members (and despite their protestations to the contrary), this policy sends unmistakable messages to militaries, governments, and publics around the world: possession of nuclear weapons is legitimate, necessary for true security, and the defining characteristic of powerful states; the members of NATO will continue to arm themselves with these weapons regardless of the nuclear abstinence of other states and regardless of NPT

²⁸ These countries are Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey. NATO members claim that this policy is not a violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, asserting that the treaty does not apply in time of “general war”. This claim has been rejected by many NNWS parties to the treaty. Preambular paragraph 9 of U.N. resolution 58/51 (the 2003 New Agenda resolution), which Canada and 127 other states voted in favour of, declares that the NPT is “binding on all the States parties at all times and in all circumstances”; this language, which also was present in the 2002 New Agenda resolution, was inserted as a deliberate reference to NATO nuclear sharing. For more on this issue, see Martin Butcher, Otfried Nassauer, Tanya Padberg, and Dan Plesch, *Questions of Command and Control: NATO, Nuclear Sharing and the NPT*, PENN Research Report 2000.1, Project on European Nuclear Non-Proliferation, March 2000 (<http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Research/2000nuclearsharing1.htm>).

obligations; and the opposition that the NATO states express to the possession of nuclear weapons by other states is hypocritical and self-serving.

24. NATO policy poses special difficulties for Canada, which has found itself in the position of arguing, in effect, that the elimination of nuclear weapons – the “only sustainable strategy for the future” – cannot be pursued for the “foreseeable future”.

25. Reform of NATO policy is essential if the NATO NNWS are to play a bridging role in the currently polarized debate, and significant reforms would themselves constitute a vital element of the compromises necessary to make such a bridge a reality. Reform of these policies is thus the single most important contribution that the NATO NNWS could make. **Canada and the other NATO NNWS should place NATO nuclear policy reform at the top of their nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation agenda.**

26. In recent years, Canada and several other NATO NNWS have begun such a challenge, working to modify alliance policy and move NATO and the NATO NWS more toward the centre of the debate. The most notable result of these efforts was NATO’s decision in 1999 to conduct the so-called “paragraph 32” review of its arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation policies, which led NATO to formally state its support for the “13 practical steps” listed in the *Final Document* of the 2000 NPT Review Conference.²⁹ The subsequent NAC-sponsored U.N. resolution in support of the 13 steps received nearly unanimous support from the NATO states.³⁰ This vote represented the high-water mark of NATO-NAC co-operation to date.

27. Since that time, however, the gulf between NATO and the NAC has been growing. The current U.S. administration has explicitly or implicitly repudiated many of the 13 steps (without, it should be noted, seeking any change in NATO’s stated support of these steps), and in 2002 and 2003 Canada was the sole NATO member to support the annual New Agenda resolution at the U.N.³¹ The on-going enlargement of NATO is bringing more and more states under the nuclear umbrella, increasing rather than decreasing the role of nuclear weapons in international security. And the possibility exists that the NATO states will be asked to endorse the “pre-emptive” strategy announced in 2002 by the U.S.³² and/or moves to design new “usable” nuclear weapons for that and other purposes.³³ Steps such as these have significantly increased both the gap between the

²⁹ For the results of NATO’s review, which also committed the alliance to pursuing a series of confidence and security building measures related to non-strategic nuclear weapons with Russia, see “Report on Options for Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs), Verification, Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament,” *NATO Press Communiqué M-NAC-2(2000)121*, 14 December 2000 (<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2000/p00-121e/home.htm>).

³⁰ With the exception of France, which abstained, all NATO members voted in favour of the resolution. See U.N. Press Release GA/9829, 20 November 2000.

³¹ See U.N. Press Releases GA/10105, 22 November 2002 and GA/10217, 8 December 2003.

³² *U.S. National Security Strategy: Prevent Our Enemies From Threatening Us, Our Allies, and Our Friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction*, September 2002 (<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/wh/15425.htm>).

³³ See Christine Kucia, “Congress Authorizes New Weapons Research,” *Arms Control Today*, December 2003 (http://armscontrol.org/act/2003_12/WeaponsResearch.asp).

NATO NNWS and the New Agenda states and the gap between NATO nuclear policy and the obligations of the NATO states under the NPT.³⁴

28. In 2002, Foreign Affairs Minister Bill Graham counselled the members of the Conference on Disarmament that “as partisans of non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament, we must assure ourselves that we not only respect our treaty obligations but that we are also seen to do so, and that our policies and practices are consistent with the spirit as well as the letter of our international undertakings.”³⁵ His comments were meant to apply to all states, but they are especially relevant to Canada and the other members of NATO. Canadians must now ask, as Debbie Grisdale commented at the Roundtable, how the Canadian government will act to resolve “the contradiction in Canadian policy regarding its commitments under the NPT and its reliance on nuclear weapons for defence for the foreseeable future” as part of NATO.³⁶

29. **With respect to NATO nuclear policy, Canada should take the following steps:**

- a) **Seek agreement within NATO to reform alliance nuclear policies, and publicly advocate adoption of a no-first-use policy by NATO and all NWS, elimination of NATO nuclear-sharing arrangements, withdrawal of nuclear weapons to NWS territory, and pursuit of arms control and disarmament measures leading to the reduction and early elimination of non-strategic nuclear weapons, all in the explicit context of working to fulfill the legal obligation of states to proceed to the total elimination of all nuclear weapons.**³⁷
- b) **Take action with other like-minded NATO NNWS to withhold consensus on any decision within NATO to support moves to expand the role of nuclear weapons, restart nuclear testing, and support pre-emptive war.**
- c) **Organize regular meetings between NATO states, NAC states, and other key NNWS to develop common positions and advocate them to the NWS and other states. Security assurances are one possible area for common efforts.**³⁸

³⁴ For discussion of NATO nuclear policy and attempts to modify it, see Dr. Erika Simpson, “NATO’s Nuclear Weapons Policy: relationships to the 2000 and 2005 NPT Review Conferences, the paragraph 32 process and future Canadian policy,” Paper presented to the CPG-MPI Roundtable, 27 February 2004, available at the Canadian Pugwash Group website (<http://www.pugwashgroup.ca/>).

³⁵ *Notes for an Address by the Honourable Bill Graham, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the Conference on Disarmament*, 19 March 2002.

³⁶ Debbie Grisdale, “The NPT and Canada’s Nuclear Weapons Policies,” Presentation to CPG-MPI Roundtable, 27 February 2004, available at the CPG website (<http://www.pugwashgroup.ca/>).

³⁷ See the recommendations related to tactical nuclear weapons in “Brief on NATO Nuclear Policy,” Middle Powers Initiative, September 2003 (http://www.middlepowers.org/mpi/pubs/natobrief_0903.pdf), and “Aide-Memoire: Making the NPT Work in 2005,” Middle Powers Initiative, October 2003.

³⁸ The Middle Powers Initiative has recommended, for example, that NATO member states support the NAC resolutions at the U.N. and engage with NAC countries and the NWS to develop a security assurances protocol (“Aide-Memoire: Making the NPT Work in 2005,” Middle Powers Initiative, October 2003).

Initiatives related to ballistic missile defence

30. The current drive on the part of the United States to deploy global and regional ballistic missile defences has negative implications for nuclear disarmament, nuclear proliferation, and global security in general.³⁹

31. For Canada, there is an additional consideration. On 15 January 2004 the Canadian government announced that it would enter into formal discussions with the United States with a view to including Canada as a participant in the U.S. missile defence program. In making the announcement, the government stated that it was seeking “to address the threats posed by the proliferation of missile technology, especially missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, in a manner that also reflects Canada’s longstanding policies on arms control, disarmament, and strategic stability.” It reaffirmed that “the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty forms the foundation of Canada’s nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation policy” and added that “Canada continues to play an active role in strengthening this cornerstone of strategic stability.”⁴⁰

32. Missile defence has long-term implications for nuclear disarmament, for the future of arms control in outer space, and for Canadian and global security. The Canadian government has made enhancing the security of Canadians one of its fundamental criteria in its consideration of missile defence participation.⁴¹ But many of the probable consequences for Canadian security of missile defence deployment appear to be ignored or underestimated by Canadian officials. These include:

- a) The danger that reductions in the Russian nuclear arsenal will slow or cease in response to U.S. missile defence deployment.⁴²

³⁹ One Roundtable participant described missile defence as “the bane of nuclear disarmament.” Dr. Bruce Blair, Presentation to CPG-MPI Roundtable, 27 February 2004.

⁴⁰ *Canada and Ballistic Missile Defence: Discussions with the United States on possible Canadian participation in the Ballistic Missile Defence of North America*, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 15 January 2004 (<http://www.dfaic-maeci.gc.ca/departement/focus/bmd-en.asp>). The use of the phrase “cornerstone of strategic stability” is unfortunate as the same document notes with calm detachment the scrapping of the ABM Treaty, which was itself described by the Canadian government as a “cornerstone of strategic stability” as recently as December 2000 (*Joint Statement of the Prime Minister of Canada and the President of the Russian Federation on Cooperation in the Sphere of Strategic Stability*, 18 December 2000); it remains described as such in the 13 practical steps. Rather than decry the loss of this earlier cornerstone, *Canada and Ballistic Missile Defence* states that in 2002 “the United States negotiated an end to the [ABM] treaty with Russia”, a claim akin to stating that in 2003 North Korea negotiated an end to its Non-Proliferation Treaty commitments.

⁴¹ Paul Chapin, Director-General, International Security Bureau, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Presentation to CPG-MPI Roundtable, 27 February 2004.

⁴² The risk of an actual arms race in response to missile defence deployment is minimal for the immediate future for a number of reasons, including the fact that Russia and the U.S. still retain arsenals of such enormous size as to preclude any “requirement” for large increases. Nonetheless, the possibility of a renewed nuclear arms race does exist over the longer term, particularly if the current, relatively harmonious state of relations between these countries deteriorates. In the meantime, the pace and eventual size of Russian reductions is likely to decrease. The U.S. missile defence deployment decision may have been one of the factors behind Russia’s recent decision to keep its SS-18 and SS-24 missiles in service long past their original service lives, for example. (Russia had originally agreed to scrap these missiles under the now-

- b) The danger that Russian (and U.S.) nuclear forces will remain on excessively high alert, posing an unacceptable risk of accidental nuclear war.⁴³
- c) The danger that the number, sophistication, and level of alert of Chinese nuclear forces aimed at North America will increase, and that these developments also will increase the risk of accidental war.⁴⁴
- d) The danger that missile defence deployment will lead to offensive and/or defensive space weapons deployments, further undermining the security of all countries.⁴⁵
- e) The danger that deployment of global or regional missile defences will have damaging effects on nuclear non-proliferation efforts.⁴⁶
- f) The danger that the abandonment of efforts to live up to the nuclear disarmament element of the NPT implied in these developments will further undermine or destroy the non-proliferation element of the Treaty.

33. At the same time, the supposed security benefits that missile defence will provide to Canadians have been exaggerated, and are based primarily on the possibility that North Korea will develop a sophisticated missile-deliverable nuclear weapon; that it will

abandoned START II Treaty.) See “Russian nuclear forces, 2003,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, July/August 2003 (<http://www.thebulletin.org/issues/nukenotes/ja03nukenote.html>).

⁴³ Dr. Bruce Blair, Presentation to CPG-MPI Roundtable, 27 February 2004. See also Bruce Blair, “Empty Reassurances,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, May/June 2000 (http://www.thebulletin.org/issues/2000/mj00/treaty_blair.html).

⁴⁴ A number of explanations have been advanced to explain China’s current effort to modernize/enlarge its nuclear forces, but this effort is certainly consistent with such a response. See Joanne Tompkins, “How U.S. Strategic Policy Is Changing China’s Nuclear Plans,” *Arms Control Today*, January/February 2003 (http://armscontrol.org/act/2003_01-02/tompkins_janfeb03.asp).

⁴⁵ The planned initial ground- and sea-based missile defence deployment is only the first element of what is intended to become an eventual layered, integrated missile defence system incorporating space-based weapons and other elements. As Dr. Bruce Blair told the Roundtable, the system scheduled to be deployed this year “is not intended as a stand-alone capability” and should not be considered in isolation from “the larger intended architecture.” Paul Chapin argued that space weapons remain a distant possibility and that Canada could participate in missile defence without worrying about any prospective link to space weapons. Asked what Canada’s “exit strategy” would be in the event such weapons were deployed, he said Canada “does not have an exit strategy for weaponization of space; we have given very little thought to that.” Ernie Regehr and others commented, however, that the development of space weapons and concomitant efforts to breach the norm against the weaponization of space have already begun. Thus, far from being unconnected to the weaponization of space, Canadian support for missile defence even now “would be understood as wavering by a key middle power on this issue.”

⁴⁶ By contributing to U.S. power projection/pre-emptive war capabilities and/or sending the message that such capabilities will become more likely to be used, such deployments may spur further development of non-conventional deterrent capabilities on the part of states that see themselves as (or see themselves characterized as) potential U.S. adversaries. For further discussion of this and other consequences of missile defence deployment, see Ernie Regehr, *Canada and Ballistic Missile Defence*, Simons Centre for Peace and Disarmament Studies, Liu Institute for Global Issues, December 2003 (<http://www.ploughshares.ca/CONTENT/ABOLISHNUCS/BMDLiureport.pdf>).

develop a missile capable of delivering such a weapon to North America; that it might seek to use those weapons in a way that would guarantee not the survival of the North Korean regime but its destruction; and that missile defence would provide effective protection against such use.⁴⁷ While these possibilities cannot be excluded entirely, it is much more likely that missile defence will play no role in making Canadians more secure from this supposed threat. Indeed, the most likely possibility is that the Korean nuclear crisis will be resolved diplomatically, assuming all parties show the will to proceed. As the Hon. Maurice Strong told the Roundtable, “A solution is available. The elements of a solution are there.”⁴⁸

34. In short, the near-certain security costs of missile defence deployment far outweigh the remote possibility that such a deployment might bring security benefits to Canadians.

35. A secondary argument sometimes made to justify potential Canadian participation in missile defence is that Canada must have “a seat at the table” from which it can attempt to influence U.S. missile defence and space policy. However, no influence is possible where no attempt is made to exercise it. Canadian officials who were asked in 1998 about use of Canada’s NORAD seat to advocate Canada’s views supporting the ABM Treaty and to oppose space weaponization stated that no attempt had been made to present those views at that table. Diplomatic and other intergovernmental fora, not military-to-military contacts at NORAD, are the appropriate places to press Canada’s views on these subjects, it was stated.⁴⁹

36. Canada is already present at these fora. What is required, therefore, is not a seat at the missile defence table, but the determination to advocate Canada’s views, even when those views are not always well received.

37. Canadian policy should look beyond short-term questions of pleasing a U.S. administration that may or may not be in office in 2005. Canadian participation is not essential to the U.S., and thus the cost to Canada of non-participation is likely to be minimal: the option not to participate exists and Canada should take it.⁵⁰

⁴⁷ It should be noted that North Korea is not the only “threat” cited to justify missile defence deployment. Paul Chapin stated to the Roundtable that a “half-dozen” other, unspecified countries also might develop long-range missiles and nuclear capabilities in the future. However, the North Korean “threat” – although itself tenuous – is by far the most plausible of these possibilities over the next decade or more.

⁴⁸ Hon. Maurice Strong, CPG-MPI Roundtable Keynote Address, 26 February 2004.

⁴⁹ Discussion at the Roundtable on Canada, NORAD and Missile Defence, Ottawa, 30 September 1998.

⁵⁰ Canada has taken this option twice before. In 1967, when the United States decided to deploy the Sentinel missile defence system, a minimal ground-based ballistic missile defence system designed to protect the United States against “rogue states” and accidental launches of a small number of missiles, the Canadian government of Prime Minister Lester Pearson opted against Canadian participation and insisted on amending the NORAD agreement to make it clear that Canadian participation was not required. Similarly, in 1985, the government of Prime Minister Brian Mulroney turned down a U.S. invitation to participate in research related to the missile defence program of that time, the Strategic Defense Initiative. For more detail on the argument against Canadian participation this time, see *Canada and Ballistic Missile Defence*.

38. With respect to missile defence, Canada should take the following steps:

- a) **Decide against participation in the U.S. missile defence system because it is not configured in a manner consistent with Canadian disarmament and non-proliferation interests and prevention of weaponization of space.**
- b) **Work actively to shape the evolution of U.S. missile defence/space policy at all relevant fora, seeking both to mitigate the effects of missile defence on nuclear disarmament and to prevent the weaponization of space.**
- c) **Organize preliminary discussions on the contents of a treaty on the prevention of an arms race in space/prevention of space weaponization. Although no U.S. government participation in such discussions can be expected during the current administration, many states with space capabilities might participate, and if discussions were organized to permit representation by non-governmental entities, including corporate space interests, U.S. corporations with an interest in non-weaponized space might participate. Such discussions could be used to prepare the groundwork for actual treaty negotiations at the CD or elsewhere when conditions for progress are more propitious.⁵¹**
- d) **Promote formal and ad hoc missile proliferation control measures, and work to develop proposals for a missile flight-test moratorium and missile control regimes that combine disarmament and non-proliferation objectives.**
- e) **Pursue an accidental war prevention initiative. Elements of such an initiative should include a No-Launch-on-Warning agreement or pledges; physical de-alerting/accidental launch prevention measures; and global missile launch warning/false alarm prevention measures. Such an initiative could be seen as both a complement to the “protection” offered by missile defence systems and a means of reducing the “need” for such systems. It would also be an extremely important safety measure in its own right.**

Other nuclear arms control and disarmament initiatives

39. In 2002, Foreign Affairs Minister Graham appealed to CD member states to demonstrate the flexibility needed to overcome the CD’s impasse, citing three specific areas of “importance to our future collective security”: negotiation of a Fissile Materials Cutoff Treaty, prevention of an arms race in outer space, and work on other aspects of nuclear disarmament. While clearly stating Canada’s preference for working within the CD, he also stated that alternatives were available, adding specifically that “ad hoc,

⁵¹ For one such proposal, see Rebecca Johnson, “Multilateral Approaches to Preventing the Weaponisation of Space,” *Disarmament Diplomacy*, April 2001 (<http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd56/56rej.htm>). For an overview of a range of approaches that might be used, see Sarah Estabrooks, “Preventing the weaponization of space: Options for moving forward,” Project Ploughshares Briefing #03-3, March 2003 (<http://www.ploughshares.ca/CONTENT/BRIEFINGS/brf033.html>).

parallel processes have been shown to yield real results.”⁵² Despite the best efforts of Canada and many other states, however, the CD remains paralysed.

40. The CD deadlock is now over half a decade in duration. With no end in sight, the time is appropriate for Canada to act on its suggestion that alternative fora be sought. One suggestion made at the Roundtable was that Canada should seek to address some of these issues at the U.N. Disarmament Commission or through the creation of an alternative, parallel CD structure. Other participants echoed Foreign Affairs Minister Graham’s suggestion of ad hoc approaches.

41. The Canadian Pugwash Group and the Middle Powers Initiative recommend that Canada **initiate a series of meetings among states (e.g., like-minded NATO NNWS, New Agenda members, and other interested states) and elements of the public (e.g., NGOs, universities, corporations) interested in advancing the disarmament agenda, with the goal of enabling preliminary discussions to proceed on a range of topics currently blocked at the CD.** Co-located but separate discussions could be held in all three of the areas specified by Minister Graham: fissile materials, outer space, and nuclear disarmament in general. The purpose of separating these discussions would be to enable states opposed to one area of work to attend and participate in other areas; the purpose of co-locating them would be to enable states attending one discussion to monitor or even contribute unofficially to discussions that they were not officially participating in. Specific topics for the general nuclear disarmament discussion might include confidence and security building measures related to the prevention of accidental nuclear war (e.g., ruling out “launch on warning”; undertaking de-alerting/de-mating measures), improved security assurances, the possible contents of a convention to ban nuclear weapons,⁵³ and/or creation of a nuclear weapons/nuclear materials register.⁵⁴

42. Such discussions would not and could not replace the negotiating role of the CD, but they might enable progress in the form of “pre-negotiation” and scoping discussions – the results of which could be taken to the CD once conditions were more conducive or, if necessary, taken to a specifically created forum, as was done with the “Ottawa process” for the landmines convention.

43. Canada also should **act to strengthen the IAEA and the broader international safeguards and export controls regime.** Recent revelations of the existence of a

⁵² *Notes for an Address by the Honourable Bill Graham, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the Conference on Disarmament*, 19 March 2002.

⁵³ In 1997, the Lawyers’ Committee on Nuclear Policy published a Model Nuclear Weapons Convention to contribute to discussion of the contents of such a convention (<http://www.lcnp.org/mnwc/convention.htm>). The 1998 report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada and the Nuclear Challenge*, recommended that Canada support negotiation of a nuclear weapons convention.

⁵⁴ *Canada and the Nuclear Challenge* recommended that Canada support creation of a nuclear weapons register. The government’s response at the time was noncommittal, but it did express support for greater transparency measures. A nuclear weapons/materials register would contribute to Canada’s current efforts to promote more detailed reporting and greater accountability in the NPT review process, and it would also hold the potential of extending such information-gathering to include the non-NPT states, providing data of potential use for a Fissile Materials Cutoff Treaty, and collecting baseline data that would be of eventual use in verification of the elimination of nuclear weapons.

sophisticated black market in proliferation-related technologies have highlighted the need for much greater vigilance on the part of the IAEA and the international community. Meanwhile, the IAEA's budget for verification activities remains only U.S. \$100 million per year, or about the amount the world spends on armed forces every hour. Neither the non-proliferation objectives nor the peaceful uses of nuclear energy objectives of the Non-Proliferation Treaty can be accomplished without the existence of effective institutions and mechanisms to prevent nuclear proliferation through technology transfer. Canada and other members of the international community need urgently to ensure that these institutions and mechanisms are strong enough to do the job required.

44. The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which Canada recently decided to join, was also the subject of discussion at the Roundtable. The PSI must reinforce existing international regimes and not become a discriminatory substitute. Not enough is known publicly about how PSI will operate in practice, and several concerns were expressed. The initiative has the potential to make a significant contribution to the prevention of proliferation, but Canada should **work to ensure that the PSI and other such initiatives operate based on standards and criteria that reinforce existing international regimes and enhance international law.**⁵⁵

⁵⁵ Jonathan Granoff advanced the following principles at the Roundtable:

- A. Strive for universality, transparency in decision making with proper regard for legitimate commercial and security interests, verifiability, and equity in application.
- B. Ensure strict compliance with existing international law relating to transit, such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
- C. Reinforce the verification regimes of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and assist in the creation of strengthened verification methods for the Biological Weapons Convention.
- D. Strengthen mechanisms within the existing regimes to more clearly determine prohibited and permitted activities relating to transport of identified materials, components, and technologies.
- E. Apply constraints and principles in a universal and equitable manner.
- F. Apply restrictions in such a manner as to reinforce the existing arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament commitments and norms contained in treaty regimes.
- G. Assist in establishing objective positive standards by which countries are determined to be in good standing with the existing relevant treaty regimes.
- H. Ensure all measures reinforce the United Nations system and the rule of law.

Where new programs are created law might also need to be created. To address a defined problem there must be every effort to enlarge the engagement in the creation of such laws to the largest possible constituency. Only in that manner will the legitimacy of international legal institutions be vouchsafed. Enfranchisement in the creation of legal processes is the surest way of gaining the necessary political support for an effective outcome.

E. Conclusions

45. Canada has the potential to play a key bridging role, in co-operation with other states, to open the road toward disarmament and non-proliferation progress. Successfully building this bridge, however, will require higher-level political engagement in Canada (and around the world), assignment of greater attention and priority to the issue, a willingness to challenge the complacency and inertia of the nuclear establishments of the NWS, and a commitment to address missile defence from the standpoint of its consequences for nuclear disarmament. Canadian policy will not be effective if it continues trying to be all things to all parties, if it continues trying to stand on both banks of the divide instead of working to build the bridge between them.

46. The Canadian Pugwash Group and the Middle Powers Initiative recommend that the Canadian government take a leading role in a) energizing global dialogue on nuclear weapons, b) building bridges in the nuclear debate, and c) minimizing the negative consequences of missile defence deployment. Canada's support for NATO's nuclear policies undermines its efforts to advance nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Canada can use its position as an NWS ally, however, to work for NATO policy reform and to minimize the negative consequences of missile defence. In this way, Canada could turn its position to advantage and play a key bridge-building role. The Canadian Pugwash Group and the Middle Powers Initiative urge the Government of Canada to work with like-minded governments inside and outside of NATO to take up the challenge of building bridges to a nuclear-weapons-free future for Canada and the world.

Appendix 1: Roundtable Program

The Non-Proliferation Treaty and Canada's Nuclear Weapons Policies

Thursday, February 26, 2004

- 6:00 p.m. Reception for Invited Participants, Government officials and Parliamentarians
- 6:50 p.m. Dinner
- 8:10 p.m. Opening of Roundtable
Senator Douglas Roche, O.C., Chairman
- 8:15 p.m. Welcome by Dr. Adele Buckley, Chair, Canadian Pugwash Group
- 8:20 p.m. **Keynote Address:**
“North Korea and the Implications of Nuclear Proliferation”
Hon. Maurice Strong, P.C., Policy Advisor to Prime Minister Paul Martin, Special Advisor to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and Personal Envoy of U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan to the Korean Peninsula
- 9:00 p.m. Questions by Participants
- 9:30 p.m. Adjournment

Friday, February 27, 2004

- 8:00 a.m. Registration and coffee
- 8:30 a.m. **Session I**
“Meeting the Challenges to the Non-Proliferation Treaty”
- The integrity of the NPT regime and threats to the NPT, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and the Fissile Material Control Treaty (FMCT)
 - Strategic and tactical nuclear weapons reductions; IAEA safeguards and Additional Protocols
 - Implications of the International Court of Justice ruling on the illegality of nuclear weapons
 - Recommendations and strategies for the 2005 NTP PrepComm Review

Chaired by: Jonathan Granoff, President, Global Security Institute

Speakers: Ambassador Sergio de Queiroz Duarte, former Ambassador of Brazil to Canada and Brazilian Ambassador-at-large for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation

Tariq Rauf, Head, Verification and Security Policy, Office of External Relations and Policy Coordination, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Vienna

9:30 a.m. Participants' Discussion

10:15 a.m. Coffee Break

10:45 a.m. *Session II*

“NATO and the New Agenda Coalition: Building a Bridge”

- NATO's nuclear weapons policy in relationship to Final Document of NPT 2000 Review Conference
- Implications for Canada of NATO Paragraph 32 Process
- The Role of the New Agenda Coalition at the NPT 2000 Review Conference and prospects for 2005
- New Agenda Resolutions at UNGA and the NATO voting record
- Strengthening the centre of the nuclear weapons debate

Chaired by: Dr. Mary-Wynne Ashford, former President of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW)

Speakers: Erika Simpson, Ph.D., Associate Professor, University of Western Ontario, Visiting Fellow, Liu Institute for the Study of Global Issues, University of British Columbia

Alyn Ware, NGO Representative on New Zealand Delegation to NPT 2000 Review Conference; Global Coordinator, Parliamentary Network for Nuclear Disarmament (PNND); Consultant, Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy (LCNP), USA

11:45 a.m. Participants' Discussion

12:30 p.m. Luncheon

1:30 p.m.

Session III**“Implications of Ballistic Missile Defence on the Nuclear Disarmament Agenda”**

- Foreseeable impact of BMD on nuclear disarmament, nuclear proliferation and the global arms race
- The possibility of ‘Fortress America’ and the eventual weaponization of Outer Space; the implications of BMD and TMD’s implications for NORAD and NATO
- Researching, developing and promoting improved methods for preventing or deterring NPT treaty violations; improving methods for enforcing compliance with treaties

Chaired by: Dr. Bruce G. Blair, President, Center for Defense Information,
Washington

Speakers: Paul Chapin, Director General, International Security Bureau, DFAIT

Ernie Regehr, Executive Director, Project Ploughshares

2:30 p.m.

Participants Discussion

3:10 p.m.

Coffee Break

3:30 p.m.

Session IV**“Canada’s Role in Nuclear Disarmament”**

- Promoting the NPT 13 Practical Steps
- Standardized reporting
- Enhanced NGO participation
- Building international links: NATO-NAC
- New proposals for recommendations at NPT Third PrepComm, 2004

Chaired by: Senator Douglas Roche, O.C., former Chairman, Canadian Pugwash Group (CPG) and Chairman, Middle Powers Initiative (MPI)

Speakers: Debbie Grisdale, Executive Director, Physicians for Global Survival (PGS)

Ambassador Paul Meyer, Canadian Ambassador to Conference on Disarmament, Geneva

- 4:15 p.m. Participants' Discussion
- 4:45 p.m. CPG-MPI Closing Comments
- 5:00 p.m. Roundtable Ends

Appendix 2: List of Roundtable Participants

ASHFORD, Dr. Mary-Wynne, Adjunct Professor at the University of Victoria and former President of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW)

BLAIR, Dr. Bruce G., President, Center for Defense Information (CDI), Washington

BUCKLEY, Dr. Adele, Chair of Pugwash Canada

CHAPIN, Paul, Director General, International Security Bureau, DFAIT

CIPOLAT, Dr. Urs, Program Manager of Middle Powers Initiative, Global Security Institute

COLLINS, Robin, Board Member of World Federalists

COWAN-SHARP, Jessy, Canadian Student Young Pugwash, Researcher at the Centre for Defense Information (CDI), Washington

DELONG, Bev, Chair of the Canadian Network to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, President, Lawyers for Social Responsibility

DORN, Dr. Walter, Associate Professor and Co-Chair, Security Studies Department Canadian Forces College, Toronto

DUARTE, Ambassador Sergio de Queiroz, Brazilian Ambassador-at-large for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation

ESTABROOKS, Sarah, Program Associate, Project Ploughshares

GRANOFF, Jonathan, President, Global Security Institute

GRISDALE, Debbie, Executive Director, Physicians for Global Survival (PGS), Ottawa

HEINBECKER, Ambassador Paul, Director of the Centre for Global Relations, Governance and Policy at Wilfrid Laurier University and former Canadian Ambassador to the United Nations

LAKER, Marina, Deputy Director, Non-Proliferation, Arms Control & Disarmament Division (IDA), DFAIT

LAWSON, Bob, Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament Division, DFAIT

MEINCKE, Peter, President Emeritus of University of Prince Edward Island, CPG Executive member

MEYER, Ambassador Paul, Canadian Ambassador to Conference on Disarmament, Geneva

PAUL, Dr. Derek, professor (ret.) of physics, University of Toronto, CPG Executive Member

PEARSON, Michael, Policy Advisor and Consultant, Office of the Minister, DFAIT

PLEKHANOV, Dr. Sergei, Associate Professor, York University, CPG Executive member

RAUF, Tariq, Head, Verification and Security Policy, Office of External Relations and Policy Coordination, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Vienna

REGEHR, Ernie, Executive Director, Project Ploughshares

ROBINSON, Bill, researcher/writer/editor, Rapporteur for Roundtable

ROCHE, Senator Douglas, O.C., Chair of the Middle Powers Initiative and former Chair of Canadian Pugwash Group

SIMONS, Dr. Jennifer Allen, President, The Simons Foundation
Vancouver, B.C.

SIMPSON, Dr. Erika, Associate Professor, University of Western Ontario, Visiting Fellow, Liu Institute for the Study of Global Issues, University of British Columbia, CPG Executive member

STANSFIELD, Ron, Senior Policy Advisor (Nuclear), Nuclear and Chemical Disarmament Implementation Division, DFAIT

STAPLES, Stephen, Director, Project on the Corporate-Security State, Polaris Institute

STRONG, Hon. Maurice, P.C., Policy Advisor to Prime Minister Paul Martin, Special Advisor to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and Personal Envoy of U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan to the Korean Peninsula

THOMSON, Murray, O.C., Founding Director of Peacefund Canada

WALKER, Ambassador Peter, former Canadian Ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency and Chairman of the IAEA Governing Board, CPG Executive

WARE, Alyn, Global Coordinator, Parliamentary Network for Nuclear Disarmament (PNND)

Appendix 3: The 13 Practical Steps

The Conference agrees on the following practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament”:

1. The importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications, without delay and without conditions and in accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.
2. A moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending entry into force of that Treaty.
3. The necessity of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator in 1995 and the mandate contained therein, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years.
4. The necessity of establishing in the Conference on Disarmament an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate establishment of such a body.
5. The principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures.
6. An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties are committed under Article VI.
7. The early entry into force and full implementation of START II and the conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons, in accordance with its provisions.
8. The completion and implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the International Atomic Energy Agency.
9. Steps by all the nuclear-weapon States leading to nuclear disarmament in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all:
 - Further efforts by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally;
 - Increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to the nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to Article VI and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress on nuclear disarmament;

- The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process;
- Concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems;
- A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination;
- The engagement as soon as appropriate of all the nuclear-weapon States in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.

10. Arrangements by all nuclear-weapon States to place, as soon as practicable, fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes.

11. Reaffirmation that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

12. Regular reports, within the framework of the strengthened review process for the Non-Proliferation Treaty, by all States parties on the implementation of Article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament”, and recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996.

13. The further development of the verification capabilities that will be required to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world.