

## **National Missile Defense (NMD)**

**Presentation by Professor Ann Denholm Crosby**

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NMD is a program designed to defend continental U.S. from a limited intercontinental ballistic missile attack. It is limited in a number of ways:

- only intercontinental ballistic missiles
- only 20 from 'rogue states,' now 'states of concern,' including Iraq, Iran and N.Korea and/or an accidental launch from Russia or China
- at present it is limited to two ground-based set of interceptors...one to be established in Alaska
- at present it is also limited to the use of non-nuclear weapons as interceptors

It is also limited in that it is touted to be both defence and deterrence and it is neither. With effort on the part of those who seek to do damage to the U.S. it is easily subverted in its present guise:

- can be overwhelmed by sending more than 20 missiles, or by MIRVing a small number of missiles
- can be confused by the use of decoys
- can be by-passed altogether through the use of other means (short range missiles fired from offshore, terrorists attacks from within the country, etc.)

Moreover, if the overwhelming power of US military resources, even its conventional ones, cannot deter an aggressor, nothing can.

The NMD system, if deployed then, invites an arms race.

The system encourages those who seek to do damage to the U.S. to find ways to subvert it and encourages the U.S. to find ways to address the subversions. As will be shown, this arms race extends inevitably to space-based weaponry and technologies.

In its present incarnation, the NMD is also ABM Treaty non-compliant.

For all these reasons, the program has the potential to seriously destabilize global relations, particularly Russian/U.S. relations, for these reasons too, major NATO countries, Russia and China have voiced their profound disapproval of the program.

What I want to do here is talk about the NMD in two contexts:

1. in the context of related U.S. defence program planning
2. in the context of Canadian participation through NORAD, the joint Canada/U.S. military command established in 1958 for the aerospace defence of the continent

### ***NMD in the Context of Related U.S. Defence Planning***

NMD is neither a stand alone program, nor a finite one. It is part of what the U.S. has referred to as its Global Protection System, and deploying the system as presently designed is only one step toward achieving the much more sophisticated defence programs that are now in their planning stages.

Indeed, not only is it readily admitted in the U.S. that NMD will produce an arms race, but dealing with that arms race is not seen as a problem for R&D is well underway for all manner of weapons, including space-based weapons, to be operated in connection with the NMD program. This R&D is in accordance with U.S. Space Command's Long Range Plan entitled "Vision for 2020", USSPACECOM being the command responsible for operating the NMD and its follow-on programs (a copy of the Executive Summary is attached).

Four key missions support the planning that is underway in the U.S. today (see attached article in Space Technology).

- 1) "space support - launching and operating spacecraft"
- 2) 2nd, "space force enhancement - providing services and information from space in the areas of navigation, missile warning, intelligence, communication, and battle management, or "support to the warfighter" roles."

These systems are already more or less in place and involve a dense layering of land, sea, air, and space surveillance, communication and battle management technologies which have been used to support such initiatives as the U.S. anti-terrorist bombings of Afghanistan and the Sudan, as well as the NATO bombings of Bosnia and Kosovo. It is these systems that support the U.S. Theatre Missile Defence program, the 'Global Protection System' which allows the U.S., according to the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, "to protect U.S. forces, U.S. allies, and other important countries, including areas of vital interest to the U.S., from theatre missile attacks."

To date, and since 1991, the bulk of U.S. missile defence funding has been directed towards the Theatre Missile Defence program, with the Gulf War being a major catalyst for its development. As General Charles Horner, the Commander of U.S Space Command, commented:

The number one (*italics added*) lesson from Desert Storm was that we must develop a ballistic missile defense system capable of directly supporting deployed troops as well as defending North American borders from ballistic missile attack. As the potential for international proliferation of long-range missiles and weapons of mass destruction escalates, an integrated Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system will provide the political and military leverage critical to limiting sources of regional instability and to confining violence should conflict occur.

I will come back to subject of theatre missile defences when we view NMD in the context of NORAD.

- 3) mission supporting present planning within USSPACECOM - "space control or space superiority - the protecting of one's own access to space while denying a potential adversary the same"...note also the word control for we will come back to this too.
- 4) "space force application - applying military force from space to a terrestrial target"

With regard to the last two missions, General Joseph Ashy, Commander of USSPACECOM, said in 1996:

We'll expand into these two missions (space control and space force application) because they will become increasingly important...we will engage terrestrial targets someday - ships, airplanes, land targets - from space. We will engage targets in space from space....We also will engage reentry vehicles in the medium of space with a ballistic missile defense system of North America...Its going to happen - absolutely . We're going to fight in space. We're going to fight from space and we're going to fight into space.

So, NMD is integrated into the U.S. global missile defence programs...it is the element that is meant, for now, to defend the North American Theatre against ballistic missile attacks...but only for now. The plans are to extend the system...into space and into use of the range of space-based weapons that are now in their R&D stages. In this context, should note that 75 U.S. industries with defence production interests have been involved in producing USSPACECOM's Long Range Plan. Should also note that NORAD also contributed to the development of the plan....this brings us to NORAD, and hence to the Canadian, connection.

### ***NMD, NORAD and Canada***

One cannot talk about Canada's relationship to the US National Missile Defense Program without talking about NORAD... The NORAD Agreement is the vehicle for Canadian participation in the U.S. National Missile Defense Program...and Canada would participate in the US program through the joint Canada/U.S.NORAD military command as it presently exists.

USSPACECOM and NORAD share headquarters space and operations centres in Colorado Springs, as well as a Commander-in-Chief. All quotes cited so far, are therefore also those of the Commander of NORAD.

The missile defence and space-based programs described here have their origins not only in SDI, but also in Reagan's Strategic Defense Architecture 2000 program --- a planning program initiated in 1982 and designed to integrate North American land, air and space-based defences... the program was under the auspices of the double-hatted Commander of NORAD. Need to remember that it was in 1981, as interest in ballistic missile defences was growing in the U.S. that the clause exempting Canada from participation in active BMD was dropped from the NORAD Agreement.

In 1985, Canada refused the US invitation to participate in SDI but shortly thereafter it renewed the NORAD Agreement with full knowledge that the US was developing plans for space-based weapons and missile defences. Canadian political personnel were briefed by the Commander of NORAD prior to the renewal in 1986...and told that it would be increasingly difficult in the coming years to limit NORAD's operations to air defences...and that space-based weapons and missile defences were a part of the future.

There have been three renewals of the NORAD Agreement since then and each has drawn us closer to participation in these programs.

In 1991, as the U.S. was establishing funding and legislation for the range of missile defence programs described, the NORAD Agreement was renewed without changes.

For the 1996 renewal, the NORAD Agreement was completely rewritten so as to allow Canada to participate in the range of U.S. missile defence programs, including NMD... and both Canadian and U.S. political bodies understood this to be the case. Reflecting the quotes I have cited with regard to US interests in controlling space, NORAD's mandate was changed from "aerospace surveillance and warning" to "aerospace control."

Further, the rewritten agreement mandated Canadian NORAD military personnel to work in all USSPACECOM operations centres in Cheyenne Mt in Colorado and to support the missions of the U.S. commands that were supported by those Centres. In this way, Canada is already participating in U.S. missions worldwide through the NORAD Command structure.

Indeed when General Joseph Ashy, the Commander of both U.S. SPACE Command and NORAD, announced the signing of the new NORAD Agreement to the U.S. Senate in March 1996, he declared that with that signing, NORAD would become one command within a system of "interdependent commands that make important contributions to the security of the United States and Canada, and bring the power of space to U.S. military operations worldwide."

There were no public hearings prior to the 1996 NORAD Renewal and although the House of Commons did debate the renewal issue, they did so without access to a copy of the rewritten agreement and without any explanation of what it entailed.

And now we have the NMD program before us...the tip of the iceberg of U.S. missile defence programs. The government has held public hearings on the issue but those hearings were divorced from considerations of the NORAD Agreement which was due to be renewed in the Spring of 2001. Prior to the government reaching any definitive...or public... conclusions about whether to participate in the US NMD program, however, it surreptitiously renewed the NORAD Agreement in June of this year and for a period of 6 years, rather than the usual 5, thus extending its current term beyond the date that had been established at that time for deployment of the NMD system.

Renewing the agreement in this manner sent a clear signal to the U.S. that Canada condoned its NMD program planning, and according to senior NORAD military personnel, this was the message that was received.

I want to make three final and quick points:

- 1) Although NORAD is a joint Canada/U.S. military command, Canada has never had political access to the planning of NORAD defence programs...there is a consultative clause in the rewritten 1996 agreement allowing for consultations when requested...by their own admission, however, DFAIT bureaucrats responsible for Canada/U.S. defence relations rely to a large extent on public documents and trade journals for their information about developing NORAD plans...the kinds of sources I have used here. There is no routinized oversight of NORAD planning or activities by the Canadian political establishment.
- 2) There is a very real fear on the part of Canadian politicians and political bureaucrats of provoking the ire of the U.S. by not participating in NMD and its follow-on programs.

And this is a significant, if not the over-riding, calculation on which decisions hang. This is expressed as a fear that the U.S. "Will make it uncomfortable" for Canada if we do not participate in NMD...when pressed to put content in this statement, the return is "we have to sit across the table from Americans in a range of fora, and they will make it uncomfortable for us in these fora." Since the majority of the major world powers, however, are against NMD, I suspect it would be difficult for the U.S. to single out Canada as 'the bad guy' in these fora.

- 3) There is a belief amongst bureaucrats and politicians that Canadian non-participation in the US NMD program would write the end to NORAD. This is probably true...

By addressing the NMD issue, then, we are also addressing the issue of the continuance of NORAD...and here we have to consider the following question:

Do we as Canadians want to be automatically, and slavishly, involved in the pursuit of U.S. interests world wide as well as in a NMD system that

- is neither ABM Treaty compliant nor consistent with our position in the Conference on Disarmament against the militarization of space
- has the real propensity to spark an arms race
- will inevitably, if technologically possible, involve the militarization of space in the near future...in 15 to 20 years according to the Canadian Deputy Commander of NORAD a few weeks ago

OR...do we want to establish the means whereby we would be consulted by the U.S. on a regular basis as regards its interests and to support and/or participate in U.S. initiatives when we feel it is in our interest to do so.

**Bottom Line:** It has been publicly stated by NORAD military personnel that the U.S. wants Canada to participate in NMD to lend the program legitimacy through Canada's good name in int'l security matters...should we comply, I doubt our reputation would remain 'good' for long.

## **NOTES**

General Charles A. Horner, "CINCNORAD Perspective on Shaping NORAD in a Post-Soviet World" (Colorado Springs: NORAD Headquarters, February 1993)

1995 Report to the Congress on Ballistic Missile Defense (Washington: Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, September 1995), p.2-1.

As quoted in Canadian NORAD Region - Past, Present, Future: Evolution to Meet Tomorrow's Needs (North Bay: Canadian NORAD Region Headquarters, Summer 1995): pp.12-13. The quotation is dated April 1994.

The four missions and the quote are from "USSC Prepares for Future Combat Missions in Space," Space Technology (August 5, 1996), 51 From a report on CINCNORAD's briefing of members of Canada's Department of External Affairs, prepared by Michael Shenstone, Assistant Deputy Minister, Political and International Security Affairs, April 17, 1985. Department of External Affairs file 27-14-NORAD-3, vol.6.

Testimony of General Joseph W. Ashy to the Senate Armed Services Committee, 21 March 1996 (Washington: Federal Document Clearing House). Security Affairs, April 17, 1985. Department of External Affairs file 27-14-NORAD-3, vol.6.

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